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GRADGRIND'S EDUCATION: USING DICKENS AND
ARISTOTLE TO UNDERSTAND (AND REPLACE?)
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE'
Kent Greenfielad and John E. Nilsson'
Charles Dickens's Hard Times includes one of the most
memorable introductions in literature. It is offered by Thomas
Gradgrind, the teacher at the M'Choakumchild School:
Thomas Gradgrind, sir. A man of realities. A man of fact and
calculations. A man who proceeds upon the principle that two and
two are four, and nothing over.... With a rule and a pair of scales,
and the multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh
and measure any parcel of human nature, and tell you exactly what
it comes to. It is a mere question of figures, a case of simple
arithmetic.1
It is apparent from this single excerpt that Dickens's portrayal
of Gradgrind has much to do with the fallacies of the
Benthamite political economy of his era.2 The literary philoso-
pher Martha Nussbaum suggests that Dickens's critique of
that philosophy is still current, however, and indeed that
"Gradgrind economics has an even greater hold over the politi-
cal and intellectual life of [our] society than it did over the
society known to Dickens's characters, or to the narrating voice
in his novel."' This is because, Nussbaum contends, many of
the "rational choice" models of behavior that have gained ac-
*©1997 Kent Greenfield and John Nilsson. All Rights Reserved.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., Brown
University; J.D., The University of Chicago.
" Law Clerk to the Honorable Susan Bucklew, United States District Judge for
the Middle District of Florida, A.B., Duke University;, J.D., Boston College Law
School The authors thank Paul M. Schwartz, Joseph W. Singer, and Aviam Soifer
for their helpful comments.
1 CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES 10 (Kate Flint ed., Penguin Books 1995)
(1854).
' See, eg., Robin Glimour, The Gradgrind SchooL Political Economy in the
Classroom, 11 VICTORIAN STUD. 207-24 (1967).
3 M MrTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND
PUBLIC LIFE 8 (1995) [hereinafter NUSSBAULM, POETIC JUSTICE].
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ceptance, even a sort of hegemony, in critical scholarship "de-
rive, ultimately, from the utilitarianism known to Mr.
Gradgrind. ' Gradgrind's utilitarianism is especially pervasive
in corporate law, and Dickens's critique of it can be used to
bring a powerful attack against existing corporate law doc-
trine.
Dickens's novel follows Thomas Gradgrind, his family and
acquaintances, and the people of Coketown, the nineteenth
century English milltown where the Gradgrinds live. Hard
Times is not an intricate novel, yet it hardly lacks for compel-
ling substance. Gradgrind's daughter, Louisa, suffers through a
loveless, arranged marriage to one of the town's magnates,
Josiah Bounderby, and then falls in love with a manipulative
Lothario, who toys with her emotions. One of Bounderby's
employees, Stephen Blackpool, cares for his sickly wife, who
has recently returned from years of profligacy. Bounderby later
fires Blackpool when the latter attests to the indignities suf-
fered by the factory workers, or "Hands." Gradgrind's son,
Tom, is an inveterate gambler who eventually robs
Bounderby's bank. To avoid suspicion, Tom frames Blackpool,
who has since left Coketown. The town eventually learns the
truth but only after Blackpool dies trying to return to
Coketown to clear his name. The novel ends with Gradgrind in
emotional anguish, attempting to help his daughter escape a
failed marriage and prevent his son's capture.
Dickens uses the character of Thomas Gradgrind to cri-
tique the ethic of utilitarianism. Gradgrind not only advocates
utilitarianism's theory of mathematical rationalism but also
acts it out in his everyday life. Over the course of the novel,
however, Gradgrind learns that he cannot sustain his fierce
rationalism, admitting at the novel's close, "I mistrust myself
now."5 Nussbaum ascribes this aspect of the character to "his
failure to be the sort of person his utilitarian theory repre-
sents.' It may be more than that, though. It may be also that
Gradgrind has undergone a sort of education at the hands of
the author, one as to the proper basis for judgment. By the
novel's end he not only mistrusts his own ability to be the sort
4 NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 14.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 226.
6 NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 30.
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of person, and to act in the sort of way, that his ethical theory
requires; he also begins to mistrust the theory itself.
This Article urges that Gradgrind and Gradgrind's educa-
tion serve as useful metaphor for understanding one of corpo-
rate laws persistent paradoxes: the vitality of the business
judgment rule ("BJR") in the face of the director's fiduciary
duty to maximize shareholder profits. This Article offers a new
explanation for this paradox, drawing on Gradgrind's education
as both an analogy and a point of departure. Part I of this
Article examines Hard Times and, in particular, the critique of
utilitarianism that Gradgrind's "education" represents. Part HI
analyzes the fiduciary duty of managers to maximize profits,
characterizing that duty as the progeny, even an embodiment,
of the sort of irrational utilitarianism critiqued by Dickens.
Part IlI describes more fully the puzzle posed by the business
judgment rule, and sketches the dominant theories explaining
it. These theories have espoused that the BJR is based on
institutional concerns about courts' abilities to second-guess
corporate management. We then offer an alternative explana-
tion, analogizing the BJR to the more rational, empirical and
humanistic conception of decisionmaking about which
Gradgrind is educated. This alternative conception of
decisionmaking, suggested by Dickens, has been described in
some detail by Nussbaum, who characterizes it as Aristotelian
in nature. Part IV of this Article asks whether the business
judgment rule is not, in fact, a "second best" alternative insofar
as it retains the fiduciary duty to maximize profits as a
guidepost. Finally, Part V suggests the contours of a "first-
best" conception of fiduciary duties within corporate law-one
that replaces the guidepost of shareholder return with others
premised on Neo-Aristotelian notions of rationality.
I. GRADGRIND'S EDUCATION: THE IRRATIONALITY OF
UTILIT Is
This Part will discuss Hard Times's powerful critique of
utilitarianism, examining in particular the "education" in deci-
sionmaking Gradgrind's character undergoes in Hard Times.
This Article will later argue that the Benthamite utilitarian-
ism that is the subject of Dickens's attack is the theoretical
ancestor of the modern duty in corporate law to mAxmize
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shareholder profits. This insight will provide the basis for a
new explanation of the business judgment rule.
A. Gradgrind's Education
Literary critic F.R. Leavis took the position that, among
all Dickens's novels, Hard Times alone ranked in the "great
tradition" of English literature.7 Surely, one of the key ele-
ments of the novel's richness is the character of Thomas
Gradgrind, who is comic (in the best Dickensian tradition), yet
not static. Indeed, one might argue that Gradgrind's evolution
as a character-his growth away from a righteous certainty-is
the novel's real engine. As social commentary, Hard Times is
an attack on the prevailing economic theory of his day, utilitar-
ianism. This attack is powerful primarily because many of
Dickens's characters take the theory seriously not only as a
way to deal with abstract ethical issues but as a guide to ev-
eryday life. The "rationalism" of utilitarian reasoning is "un-
derstood not just as a way of writing up reports, but as a way
of dealing with people in daily encounters... not just as a way
of appearing professionally respectable, but as a commitment
that determines the whole content of one's personal and social
life."8 Hard Times critiques utilitarianism not by investigating
the theory at a level of abstraction but by looking at how peo-
ple would actually act in the world if they took the theory to
heart.
When we first meet Thomas Gradgrind, he is lecturing his
class of schoolchildren. He desires that his students approach
the world as he does, with reason rather than sentiment, and
"with the detached theoretical and calculative power of the
mathematical intellect, rather than the more qualitative type
of reasoned deliberation."9 Rather than call his pupils by
name, he has assigned them numbers, and the class seems to
be devoted to pedagogical exercises in rational "knowing." (For
7 FR. LEAvIS, THE GREAT TRADITION 19 (1950). According to Leavis, "[he
could] think of only one of [Dickens's] books in which his distinctive creative ge-
nius is controlled throughout to a unifying and organizing significance, and that is
Hard Times, which seems because of its unusualness and comparatively small
scale, to have escaped recognition for the great thing it is." Id.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 17.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 20.
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example, when Gradgrind asks what a horse is, he wants only
its scientific characteristics.) Deriding the imaginative facul-
ties, or "fancy," he later explains that "[a student's] reason
is... the only faculty to which education should be ad-
dressed."10 Thus, when not inculcating his students in the
capacity of reason, he works proofs "that the Good Samaritan
was a Bad Economist.""
Even at home, Gradgrind seeks to act in the way that his
theory would require. When his daughter Louisa learns that
she has been the subject of a marriage proposal on the part of
Josiah Bounderby, a boastful and wealthy manufacturer, she
asks her father for advice. Gradgrind suggests that the issue of
love is "misplaced" and advises that she "consider this ques-
tion, as you have been accustomed to consider every other
question, simply as one of tangible Fact."' He goes on to com-
pare their respective ages-she is twenty, Bounderby is fifty.
In considering whether the age difference should be a bar to
their matrimony, he urges that "it is not unimportant to take
into account the statistics of marriage." And "on reference to
the figures," Gradgrind finds that an age differential is not so
unusual. Knowledge of statistics of other people's marriages do
little to help Louisa in her personal decision, however. In inner
agony over the decision, she finally blurts out: "Father, I have
often thought that life is very short." Gradgrind, baffled, re-
plies:
"It is short, no doubt, my dear. Still, the average duration of human
life is proved to have increased of late years. The calculations of
various life assurance and annuity offices, among other figures
which cannot go wrong, having established the fact."
"I speak of my own life, father."
"Oh, indeed? Still," said Mr. Gradgrind, "I need not point out to you
Louisa, that it is governed by the laws of life in the aggregate"
Even with his own family, Gradgrind is tied to his theory's
commitment to the aggregation of pleasures and pains. His
own daughter's anguish is left unrecognized as something
distinct and important in and of itself.
, DICKENS, supra note 1, at 25.
* DICKENS, supra note 1, at 215.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 101.
" DICKENS, supra note 1, at 103.
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Dickens populates his novel with other characters who
mirror Gradgrind's attachment to the rationalism of the day.
The first of these is the aforementioned industrialist
Bounderby, who represents the practical realization of
Gradgrind's high-minded utilitarianism. As Leavis puts it, the
two characters embody "two aspects of Victorian Utilitarian-
ism," with Bounderby illustrating the pernicious "blindness"
latent in Gradgrind's "theory."14 Bounderby is the owner of
the city's factory-a place that seems to summon up Blake's
"Satanic Mills."15 He sees his employees not as people but as
producers. When one of the "Hands," Stephen Blackpool, asks
his counsel about how to divorce a profligate wife, Bounderby
explains that a divorce is possible only after an Act of Parlia-
ment, which would cost a fortune. Blackpool, dejected, mutters,
"tis a muddle. 'Tis just a muddle a 'too-gether, an the sooner I
am dead, the better."16 Bounderby responds by warning
Blackpool not to "talk nonsense.., about things you don't
understand; and don't you call the Institutions of your country
a muddle, or you'll get yourself into a real muddle one of these
fine mornings." 7 Bounderby then makes clear what he be-
lieves Blackpool's proper role to be: "The institutions of your
country are not your piece-work, and the only thing you have
got to do is mind your piece-work." 8
If Bounderby represents the practical acting out of
Gradgrind's theory, then the character of Bitzer becomes its
monster. We first meet Bitzer in Gradgrind's classroom, where
he pleases his instructor by stating precisely what a horse is:
"Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four
grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisors. Sheds coat in the
spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but
requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in
mouth." 9 Bitzer's precocity reaches a grim fruition. He grows
1' LEAVIS, supra note 7, at 20.
15 See WILL, BLAKE, Preface to Milton, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND PROSE
OF WLLIAm BLAKE 95 (David V. Erdman ed., 1988) ("And did the Countenance
Divine, / Shine forth upon our clouded hills? / And was Jerusalem builded here, I
Among these dark Satanic mils?").
16 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 79.
17 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 79-80.
"' DICKENS, supra note 1, at 80.
19 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 12.
[Vol. 63: 799
19971 DICKENS, ARISTOTLE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 805
into "an extremely clear-headed, cautious, prudent young man,
who was safe to rise in the world.... His mind was so exactly
regulated, that he had no affections or passions. All his pro-
ceedings were the result of the nicest and coldest calcula-
tion.... " Indeed, Bitzer faults himself for his weakness in
favoring his mother with half a pound of tea, insofar as "his
only reasonable transaction in that commodity would have
been to buy it for as little as he could possibly give, and sell it
for as much as could possibly get." Unlike Stephen
Blackpool and the Good Samaritan, then, Bitzer is the
paradigmatic "good economist."
The reader is repelled by Bounderby and Bitzer not be-
cause they are bad utilitarians but because they are very good
ones. Dickens teaches that people who act as good utilitarians
in their everyday lives are, as Nussbaum describes Bitzer,
"chillingly weird and not quite human."'
A key question then, is what makes Gradgrind a compel-
ling character for the reader, "a gripping and ultimately a
deeply moving character," when Bitzer and Bounderby are
not?' The answer is that Gradgrind undergoes an education:
the events of the novel work to undermine Gradgrind's confi-
dence in the rationalist method he had adopted in order to
understand life. He watches as his son succumbs to gambling
and drink and as his daughter is lost in an agonizing, empty
marriage, in spite of their rationalist schooling. Gradgrind is
also forced to reevaluate his notions of the Coketown "Hands,"
whom he had previously considered fungible commodities of
finite and predictable appetites and capacities. As he meets
individual Hands and attempts to make them conform to his
larger algorithm, he is forced to concede that "he never could
make out how it yielded this unaccountable product. '
Gradgrind also is challenged by the presence of Sissy Jupe, a
young girl who leaves a circus troupe and comes to live in the
Gradgrind household. Gradgrind is forced to admit to himself
that:
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 120.
21 DICKENS, supra, note 1, at 120.
22 NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 30.
23 NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 30.
24 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 55.
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he had become possessed by an idea that there was something in
this girl which could hardly be set forth in tabular form. Her capaci-
ty of definition might easily be stated at a very low figure, her math-
ematical knowledge at nothing; yet he was not sure that if it had
been required, for example, to tick her off into columns in a parlia-
mentary return, he would have known how to divide her.'
The climax of the novel arrives as Gradgrind, having been
jarred from the comfort of his ultra-rationality, tries to help his
son Tom escape from Coketown before he is discovered as a
thief. Bitzer finds them, and Gradgrind pleads with Bitzer to
have pity: "[HIave you a heart?" Bitzer, well trained in
Gradgrind's model school, makes the utilitarian reply:
"The circulation, sir," returned Bitzer, smiling at the oddity of
the question, "couldn't be carried on without one. No man, sir, ac-
quainted with the facts established by Harvey relating to the circu-
lation of the blood can doubt that I have a heart."
"Is it accessible," cried Mr. Gradgrind, "to any compassionate
influence?"
"It is accessible to Reason, sir," returned the excellent young
man. "And to nothing else."26
Bitzer then explains why turning in Tom to the authorities is
in Bitzer's own best interest-Bounderby will likely promote
Bitzer to Tom's former position at the bank. And in defense of
self interest, Bitzer explains,
I am sure you know that the whole social system is a question of
self-interest. What you must always appeal to is a person's self-in-
terest.... It's your only hold. We are so constituted. I was brought
up in that catechism when I was very young, sir, as you are
aware.
27
When Gradgrind then asks Bitzer to allow Tom to escape
out of gratitude for the education Bitzer has received, Bitzer
again defers. The narrator explains:
It was a fundamental principle of the Gradgrind philosophy,
that... [giratitude was to be abolished, and the virtues springing
from it were not to be. Every inch of the existence of mankind, from
birth to death, was to be a bargain across a counter. And if we didn't
get to Heaven that way, it was not a politico-economical place, and
DICKENS, supra, note 1, at 95-96.
26 DICKENS, supra, note 1, at 286.
DICKENS, supra, note 1, at 287.
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we had no business there.'
Gradgrind is thus faced squarely with the effects of the ethic
he has espoused throughout the novel. His son is, in fact, even-
tually saved from Bitzer. But the saviors are Sissy Jupe's
friends from the circus who hold Bitzer long enough to allow
Tom to be spirited away. They represent the antithesis of the
Gradgrind philosophy, because they dwell in a world of imagi-
nation rather than reason, community rather than self-inter-
est.
Over the course of the novel, then, Gradgrind moves from
a position of ultra-rationality, which is in fact ignorance and
even irrationality, to one of comparatively greater understand-
ing. (Bounderby and Bitzer, meanwhile, remain static, even
stunted.) The irony is that Gradgrind's resting point finds him
less certain of his reasoning faculties than his starting point.
He is less certain, in other words, than Bounderby and Bitzer.
As Gradgrind himself puts it, "Some persons hold.., that
there is a wisdom of the Head, and that there is a wisdom of
the Heart. I have not supposed so; but, as I have said, I mis-
trust myself now. I have supposed the Head to be all-suffi-
cient."2
B. The Irrationality of Utilitarianism
Gradgrind's starting point-the point from which he is
educated-is, of course, utilitarianism, and it is utilitarianism
that is the target of much of Dickens's satire and scorn. As one
critic has put it, "Hard Times is about an attitude of mind
which we define... as utilitarianism, [and] the substance of
the book is a testing of this 'philosophy.' " To appreciate the
manner in which Hard Times "tests" utilitarianism, a review of
that philosophy's core tenets might be helpful.
Philosopher John Rawls has written that "[tihe main idea
[of classical utilitarianism] is that society is rightly ordered,
and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so
as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed
DICKENS, supra, note 1, at 288.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 226.
Glimour, supra note 2, at 211.
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over all the individuals belonging to it."31 Woven into this ar-
ticulation of utilitarianism are two central, philosophical com-
ponents: first, the idea that Rawls calls satisfaction (but what
might also be termed happiness or pleasure) is the chief object
of value; and second, that its maximization therefore repre-
sents the optimal arrangement of society.
The first component of utilitarianism, then, is its use of
"happiness" as the unit of value. This is a practical, even de-
scriptive, component to the extent that the utilitarian philoso-
pher is attempting to characterize what people do value, rather
than what they should value.3 2 This is the so-called "greatest
happiness principle," which characterizes the "ultimate end" as
"an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich
as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quali-
ty."" Its corollary is that "actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness. " '
If this is so, if actions are right insofar as they promote
happiness, then the necessary conclusion is that "[tihe multi-
plication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the
object of virtue."35 Thus, the second component of utilitarian-
ism, maximization, would appear to flow from the first. Maxi-
mization poses problems, however. As Rawls has noted, the
utilitarian utopia is indifferent to whether the optimal amount
of happiness is distributed evenly (or even roughly so) or
whether one fortunate citizen is in possession of the sum to-
tal.36 Dickens, though, was not indifferent.
Leavis saw in Hard Times a nuanced portrayal of "two
aspects of Victorian Utilitarianism," encompassing both the
31 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22 (1971).
32 See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 12 (Prometheus Books 1987) (1863)
("[Mien's sentiments, both of favor and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what
they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness.").
Id. at 22.
34 Id. at 16.
31 Id. at 30.
" RAWLS, supra note 31, at 26. In Rawls's words,
[t]he striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not
matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed
among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one
man distributes his satisfactions over time. The correct distribution in
either case is that which yields the maximum fulfillment.
RAWLS, supra note 31, at 26.
[Vol. 63:799
1997] DICKENS, ARISTOTLE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMNT RULE 809
utilitarian ideal (Gradgrind the philosopher) and its degraded,
real-world embodiment (Bounderby the factory owner). And
while the satire of utilitarianism in Hard Times has been dis-
missed by some as shallow," at least one commentator argues
that "Dickens's arguments possess more cogency than he is
usually given credit for."39 It may be that the core of Dickens's
critique of utilitarianism is an attack on the arrogance of re-
ducing value to a single currency, whether happiness, dollars,
or otherwise. In one of the moments in which the author's
indignation bursts out of the story, Dickens fairly rages: "[Niot
all the calculators of the National Debt can tell me the capaci-
ty for good or evil, for love or hatred, for patriotism or discon-
tent, for the decomposition of virtue into vice, or the reverse, at
any single moment in the soul."0 In this passage Dickens lays
his agenda bare. People are not fungible; they are not merely
the indistinguishable "component drops" in the ocean of hu-
manity.4' Their value cannot be reduced to arithmetic. We
must "govern these awful unknown quantities by other
means!'4
Dickens makes a similar point through the character of
Sissy Jupe, Bitzer's counterpoint in Gradgrind's classroom.
Like Rawls, Sissy perceives the injustice inherent in sacrificing
individual happiness for some sort of aggregate happiness.
Confronted with the mathematically optimal "proportion" of
twenty-five deaths by starvation per million city dwellers,
Sissy notes "that I thought it must be just as hard upon those
who were starved, whether the others were a million, or a
million million.' Nussbaum also picks up on this aspect of
Dickens's critique when she remarks on utilitarianism's blind-
LEAVIS, supra note 7, at 20.
See Mlarjorie Stone, Dickens, Bentham, and the Fiction of the Law: A Victori.
an Controuersy and Its Consequences, 29 VICTORIAN STUD. 125 (1985).
Richard J. Arneson, Benthamite Utilitarianism and Hard Times, 2 PHIL &
LITERATURE 60, 60 (1978). Moreover, if Hard Times is melodramatic, so too were
the political repercussions of the Benthamites, which Richard Posner has invento-
ried. 'the defense of torture, the admiration for the Court of the Star Chamber,
the proposal to imprison beggars, the belief in surveillance and indoctrination, the
depreciation of rights." RICHARD POSNER, The First Neoconseruatiue, in OVERCOM-
ING LAw 270 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, The First Neoconservatiue].
"DICKENS, supra note 1, at 74.
41 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 161.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 74.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 62.
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ness toward "the separateness of... people, to their inner
depths, their hopes and loves and fears.""
This critique of the commensurability of value and the
feasibility of situating value in the aggregate reaches another
component of utilitarianism-the assertion that people are
rational maximizers. This notion was perhaps only implicit in
the writings of its early exponents but was the explicit object
of Dickens's literary ire. Inherent in utilitarianism is the belief
that, given the unit of value (whether happiness, satisfaction,
"utils" or otherwise), people will act in such a way as to secure
the maximum amount. As Rawls puts it, "[tihe most natural
way.., of arriving at utilitarianism... is to adopt for society
as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man.""
Dickens indicts this assumption through the character of
Stephen Blackpool. As one critic has pointed out: "[Blackpool]
eschews calculation, whereas it is the hallmark of the Utilitari-
an to be willing to calculate the consequences of all feasible
actions, even the most nefarious, and to choose always that act
which is expected to produce the most good in the long run.""
Blackpool himself voices what amounts to a similar critique of
utilitarianism's tendency to reduce every individual to what
she can produce, "ratin' 'em as so much Power, and reg'latin
'em as if they was figures in a soom, or machines: wi'out loves
and likeins, wi'out memories and inclinations, wi'out souls to
weary and souls to hope."47 This is the statement for which
Blackpool loses his job.
These characters, the Stephen Blackpools and Sissy Jupes
who refuse to reduce the world to a set of commensurable
values or to make decisions based on blind aggregation of such
values, strike the reader as genuine. They are the people who
most remind us of those whom the reader admires and wants
to emulate. But they are not merely good; they are also ratio-
nal. The mathematical balancing that is typical of Gradgrind's
utilitarian rationality does not seem rational at all but rather
childish and obtuse when applied in the "real" world of the
novel. The "education" that takes place in the model classroom
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 26-27.
" RAWLS, supra note 31, at 26-27.
" Arneson, supra note 39, at 68.
47 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 154-55.
[Vol. 63: 799
1997] DICKENS, ARISTOTLE AND THE BUSINESS JUDCMENT RULE 811
is impoverished, incomplete, wrong-headed, and, when applied
elsewhere, unjust. The people who apply the model classroom's
notions appear childish or irrational or inhuman.
In sum, then, Dickens uses Hard Times to show that, far
from being an exercise in rationality, utilitarian decisionmak-
ing is profoundly irrational. Its ruthless algebra is ultimately
deficient, both in insisting that value is commensurable and in
seeking solely to maximize its aggregate. Confronted with the
"unaccountable product" of the myriad variations of human
desire and sense of the good, utilitarianism fudges the num-
bers and tells itself that everything is not so complicated after
all.' But by the novel's end, Gradgrind has learned better. It
is the premise of this Article that his education has implica-
tions above and beyond a critique of Victorian utilitarianism.
C. The Aristotelian Underpinnings of Dickens's Critique
Before we apply Dickens's critique more specifically to
corporate law, it is worth noting that Hard Times's criticism of
utilitarianism can be situated within the Aristotelian tradition.
In her essay "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian
Conception of Private and Public Rationality,"'9 Martha
Nussbaum launches an Aristotelian critique of scientific ratio-
nality as a method of decisionmaking, a critique that in many
ways mirrors and extrapolates upon Dickens's critique of utili-
tarianism. Like Hard Times's attack on utilitarianism,
Nussbaum's critique focuses upon two crucial premises:
"commensurability," the idea that all things may be valued on
a single scale, whether dollars, utils or otherwise; and
"metricity," the idea that a single algorithm can then provide
an adequate basis for sound decisionmakdng."
According to Nussbaum, Aristotle was well aware of argu-
ments based on "commensurability," or the notion "that a hall-
mark of rational choice is the measurement of all alternatives
by a single quantitative standard of value."" Aristotle reject-
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 55.
49 MArTA NUSSAUM, The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Concep-
tion of Private and Public Rationality, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSO-
PHY AND iTERATURE 54 (1990) [hereinafter NUSSBAUU, Discernment of Perception].
o NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49,-at 55.
51 NUSSEAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 56.
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ed the idea that we value each object of desire in the same
way, distinguishing between that which we derive from, say,
honor, wisdom, and pleasure. Nussbaum concludes:
What [Aristotle] seems to be saying is that what we pursue or
choose when we deem each of these items choiceworthy is something
distinct, peculiar to the item in question; there is no single thing
that belongs to all of them in such a way as to offer a plausible
unitary account of their practical value. 2
Implicit in this rejection of commensurability is a repudiation
of commensurability's corollary, fungibility. If honor and wis-
dom inhabit separate scales, then they cannot be balanced
against one another, or exchanged for one another.
According to Nussbaum, the second portion of Aristotle's
critique focuses on metricity. Metricity might be defined as a
reliance upon antecedently fixed rules, or "metrics'" for the
solution of all dilemmas. A central problem with metricity is
that it is clumsy. Just as a straight ruler cannot measure the
supple contours of a fluted column, so too antecedently fixed
principles falter in addressing the myriad variations of experi-
ence. Good deliberation, Nussbaum tells us, is more like "the-
atrical or musical improvisation, where what counts is flexibili-
ty, responsiveness, and openness to the external... to rely on
an algorithm here is not only insufficient, it is a sign of imma-
turity and weakness."53 Fixed rules based on a single metric
may actually be "a falling off from full practical rationality, not
its flourishing or completion."' They often and willfully over-
simplify the complexities that decisionmakers must address.
Dickens and Aristotle thus agree that utilitarianism is, in
an important sense, irrational. As we learn from Hard Times,
individuals who actually try to take the lessons of utilitarian-
ism to heart seem childish, obtuse, or insane. As we argue in
the next Part, this is how corporate law requires management
to act.
52 NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 58.
" NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 74.
" NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 73.
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II. HARD TMES AND CORPORATE LAW
The particular implications of utilitarianism that interest
us have to do with that philosophy's theoretical progeny. As
one commentator has noted, the contours of Dickens's critique
extend beyond utilitarianism to encompass "the classical politi-
cal economists's model of human psychology.' Early on, Karl
Marx realized that utilitarianism "only became fraught with
meaning when economic relations, especially division of labour
and exchange, were included." In the Victorian era of euphe-
mism, utilitarian cant about a "happiness principle" was well
and good, but the philosophy was really and finally about eco-
nomics." Moreover, as Richard Posner has noted, utilitarian-
ism was and is about, or lends itself to, a particular sort of
economics---"the kind of laissez-faire approach associated with
economic libertarians" such as Milton Friedman."
Perhaps the closest living relative of the utilitarianism
that Dickens critiques in Hard Times is the corporate law of
the United States. Corporate law at the end of the twentieth
century is characterized by those principles that served as
targets for Dickens in the middle of the nineteenth century.
According to the majority rule, members of corporate manage-
ment are to be constrained in their decisionmaklng to a single,
over-arching goal: the maximization of shareholder wealth. It
is Friedman, a Nobel-Prize winning economist, who has fa-
mously explained the director's fiduciary duty to increase
shareholder profits: "In a free-enterprise, private-property
system a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of
the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers.
That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance
with their desires, which generally will be to make as much
money as possible .... "
s Arneson, supra note 39, at 64.
56 KARL MAX, 5 COLLECTED WORKS 414 (Lawrence & Wishhart 1976).
T.W. Hutchinson, Bentham as an Economist, 66 ECON. J. 288, 290 (1956)
("Bentham's development of; and emphasis on, the two concepts of mayimization
and utility make him above all the ancestor of neo-classical economic theorising.').
"POSNER, The First Neoconservative, supra note 39, at 263.
"Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122, 124, 126. Over a
century earlier, Herman Melville provided a dramatization of this principle in
Moby-Dick. When that novel's narrator, Ishmael, joins the Pequod's crew for its
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The seminal decision in developing and explicating the
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profits was handed
down in 1919 by the Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co.60 That case involved a suit on the part of mi-
nority shareholders against Henry Ford challenging Ford's new
policy against declaring special dividends."' In particular, the
plaintiffs pointed to the fact that, even prior to the new policy,
the company's profits had risen much faster than the divi-
dends.62 In the press, Ford had been defiant, proclaiming his
decision to reinvest in the company "[in order] to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible num-
ber, to help them build up their lives and their homes."' The
Michigan Supreme Court frowned upon Ford's philanthropic
impulses, declaring:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-dis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes."
Accordingly, Ford was ordered to pay the dividends. 5
This fiduciary duty on the part of directors to maximize
shareholder profits has become the dominant rule in Delaware,
infamous voyage, he is assigned a "lay," i.e., a share of the voyage's profits. In
figuring Ishmael's lay, one of the ship's "directors" (Captain Bildad) proposes an
apparently modest share, but the other (Captain Peleg) objects. Bildad reminds
Peleg that "thou must consider the duty thou owest to the owners of this
ship-widows and orphans, many of them-and that if we too abundantly reward
the labors of this young man, we may be taking the bread from those widows and
those orphans." HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK OR, THE WHALE 90-91 (Signet
Classic ed., 1980) (1851).
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).See id. at 671.
62 See id. at 672-73.
Id. at 671. It can be argued that Ford, in a rather quixotic way, anticipated
the so-called "social responsibility" critique of the fiduciary duty to maximize prof-
its. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CON-
TROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 80 (1975) ("[Those arguing against corporate social
responsibility] assume[ ] ... that the managers of the corporation are to be
steered almost wholly by profit, rather than by what they think proper for society
on the whole. Why should this be so?").
6' Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
65 See id. at 685.
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the key jurisdiction for American corporate law. In 1985, the
Supreme Court of Delaware stated that "[i]n carrying out their
managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.' In
1986, Chancellor William T. Allen emphasized the same point:
"It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to
maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's stockhold-
ers; that they may sometimes do so 'at the expense' of oth-
ers.., does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.'
Some have argued that Dickens's critique of utilitarianism
was insufficiently nuanced.' For example, as Nussbaum
pointed out, Bentham believed that each person should count
as one and "none more than one."' The portrayal of industri-
alists who care not at all about the desires, pleasures, and
pains of their employees thus could be critiqued on classical
utilitarian grounds. But as Nussbaum contends, Dickens's
attack is nevertheless very meaningful.7" A utilitarian econo-
mist could very consistently develop a model of human choice
that would set as the standard the maximization of personal
preferences and imbue this model with a normative dimen-
sion.7 What's more, the theory that Dickens critiqued, even
in its simple form, certainly wields real influence within cur-
rent legal and political debate.72
Corporate law is thus one of those realms where the kind
of utilitarianism that Dickens critiques still holds sway.
Wealth maximization is the normative goal. But it is not just
wealth maximization in general or societal terms that is the
touchstone of corporate law: it is the wealth maimization of
shareholders only. All choices must be analyzed as to that one
value. All other "goods" are to be taken into account only if
' Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added); see
also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986) (concluding that concern for "various constituencies" may be taken into con-
sideration by directors only if there are "rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders").
' Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (DeL Ch. 1986) (citation omit-
ted).
' See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
6NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 33.
70 NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 16.
7 NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 16.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 18.
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they are commensurable with that one measure. Choices are
well made when they serve that goal and poorly made when
they do not. Dickens's critique-that utilitarianism is irratio-
nal insofar as it requires a dependence on commensurability
and maximization-must be taken seriously when applied to
corporate law. If utilitarianism is irrational when applied in
the real world, then existing corporate law doctrine requires
corporate managers to make decisions in an impoverished way.
Law is commanding irrationality.
IM. THE PUZZLE OF T=E BusmEss JUDGEMENT RULE
One of the great puzzles of corporate law is the co-exis-
tence of the strict duty to maximize shareholder profits with
the business judgment rule, a rule of judicial deference to the
decisions of corporate management. This Part explores and
offers a new explanation for the apparent paradox between the
two legal norms.
A. The Puzzle in Action
The business judgment rule includes at least two legal
principles. As a presumption, the rule provides that the acts of
independent directors will be presumed to be taken in good
faith and with appropriate care. As a substantive rule of law,
the business judgment rule provides that the directors will
incur no liability for an injury or loss to the corporation arising
from corporate action when they, in authorizing such action,
proceeded in good faith and with appropriate care.7"
The presumptive aspect of the BJR has often been elevat-
ed over-or trumpeted to the exclusion of-the substantive
one. In Aronson v. Lewis, for example, the Delaware Supreme
73 1 ERNEST L. FOLK III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORA-
TION LAW § 141.2.2.2 (3d. ed. 1996); see also Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care,
the Business Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Gouernance
Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355, 1369 (1993) ("As a matter of substantive law, the
business judgement rule protects a director from duty of care liability to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders for a decision (and also protects the decision itself) if
the director has acted with due care and in good faith; and as a matter of proce-
dure, is a presumption that the director has so acted." (quoting DENNIS J. BLOCK,
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 8-12 (3d ed. 1991))).
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Court defined the business judgment rule entirely in terms of a
presumption: "[The business judgment rule] is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corpora-
tion acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the hon-
est belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."'4 Thus, according to the Aronson court, the BJR in-
heres wholly in a series of changes of evidentiary burdens.
Absent an abuse of discretion, managements judgment will be
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging
the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption. 6
A number of commentators have insisted that the pre-
sumptive or procedural aspects of the business judgment rule
are secondary to the substantive rule, which is "the core of the
business judgment rule."76 They argue that it is misleading to
define the rule in terms of the presumption that it engen-
ders.' Instead, they articulate a simpler and less technical
version of the business judgment rule. As Samuel Arsht puts
it,
Mhe term "business judgment rule" and the presumption that often
identifies it mean simply that a stockholder who challenges a
nonself-dealing transaction must persuade the court that the
corporation's directors, officers, or controlling stockholders in autho-
rizing the transaction did not act in good faith, did not act in a man-
ner they reasonably believed to be in the corporation's best interest,
or did not exercise the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances. 78
The key point for our purposes is that the practical effect
of the business judgment rule is that directors are accorded re-
markably wide latitude in the conduct of their corporation's
business, with courts resisting the impulse to interfere absent
some suggestion of self-dealing, conflict of interest, or illegali-
ty.7 Herein lies the apparent paradox. Even with the gener-
7' Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DeL 1984) (citations omitted).
7' See ia
IR Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business
Judgement Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1339 (1993).
" See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgement Rule Revisited 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 93, 94 (1979) ("Subsuming the presumptions and limitations under the term
'business judgement rule' leads to confusion because the single term is then em-
ployed with reference to wholly different aspects of the rule's application, which
are governed by disparate legal principles.).
78 Id& at 134.
79 See WmILIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSISS ORGANIZATION AND
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ous latitude in terms of method, there is no doubt that, in
strict legal terms, the directors' fiduciary duty is still to maxi-
mize shareholder profits. As John Coffee and William Klein
have stated, "directors have great discretion over how to maxi-
mize the return to shareholders, but not whether to."' ° But, of
course, latitude as to method gives management what is, in
effect, latitude as to ultimate goal. If courts are to take serious-
ly the duty of management to maximize the value of the firm
to shareholders, they should not apply a rule of deference to
the decisions of corporate management. Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel have also noticed the apparent incongruity:
"The fiduciary principle suggests that courts should routinely
conduct wide-ranging inquiries to determine the bargain that
managers and investors would have reached if transactions
costs were zero .... Yet judges invoke the 'business judgment
rule,' a doctrine absolving managers of liability even though
their conduct is negligent."8'
When applied in actual cases, one can easily recognize the
tension between the strictness of the underlying duty and the
deference said to arise from the business judgment rule. Take
for example the situations in which directors are confronted
with a prospective merger, a take-over, or a choice between the
two. It may be that the tension between the business judgment
rule and the fiduciary duty is at its greatest in such cases.
What is business judgment in such a situation, other than the
simple arithmetic of calculating the most advantageous price?
And if, even in these scenarios, business judgment entails
something more than gaining the highest price for sharehold-
ers, where does that leave the fiduciary duty to maximize prof-
its as a corporate compass? These questions were confronted in
a critical series of Delaware cases stretching from the 1980s to
the early 1990s.
Consider in this context Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.,82 in which the Delaware Supreme Court confronted the
issue of whether the Unocal board's actions in opposing a take-
over attempt by Mesa were entitled to the protection of the
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 127 (5th ed. 1993).
80 Id.
81 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 93 (1991).
"2 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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business judgment rule." The court's analysis began with the
"basic principle" that "directors have a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the corporation's stockholders."' None-
theless, the court noted that the business judgment rule was
applicable even in takeover situations.' The court seemingly
weakened the emphasis on shareholder supremacy when it
noted that the director's power to erect defenses to takeovers
derived from the board's "fundamental duty and obligation to
protect the corporate enterprise, which includes
stockholders' ..... "" To satisfy the standards of the BJR, it
was incumbent upon the directors in the face of an inherent
conflict of interest, to "show that they had reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed."7 The court seemed to eschew mathematical calcula-
tion. This burden could be met, it said, "by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation" on the part of the board in eval-
uating the prospective tender.
In recognizing the tension between the underlying duty
and the BJR, it is also significant that the court required the
board to consider the "element of balance,"' that is, that the
defensive measure adopted "must be reasonable in relation to
the threat posed." And in considering the seriousness of the
threat to the corporate enterprise, the board could reasonably
consider a wide range of possible effects of the takeover. In-
cluded in this list were a number of things that did not relate
directly to shareholder wealth, including "questions of illegality
[and] the impact on 'constituencies' other than the sharehold-
ers (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally)." With this analytical framework in
IId. at 953. The Unocal board had decided to issue a tender offer for the
company's own shares in response to a 'front loaded' tender offer by Mesa. Fur-
thermore, Unocal's self-tender excluded Mesa from participating, after concluding
that to do otherwise would be to finance Mesa's facially inadequate proposal. Mesa
challenged the exclusion in court See id. at 949-52.
"Id, at 955 (citation omitted).
See icl. at 954.
Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954, 955.
,I& at 955.
9Id-
9Id.
21 I&
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place, the Unocal court concluded that the "front loaded" na-
ture of Mesa's tender, as well as Mesa's reputation as a
"greenmailer," justified the board's defensive measures and
thus entitled them to the protections of the business judgment
rule.92
The difficulty of reconciling the fiduciary duty with the
BJR is also illustrated by Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.93 and its apparent inconsistencies with Unocal.
In Revlon, the Supreme Court of Delaware confronted the issue
of the validity of lock-ups and related defensive agreements in
the face of an active bidding contest for corporate control."
Although the case was decided only a few months after Unocal,
the Revlon court's emphasis was very different. It diminished
the importance of the deference represented by the BJR:
"[w]hile the business judgment rule may be applicable to the
actions of corporate directors responding to takeover threats,
the principles upon which it is founded-care, loyalty and
independence-must first be established."95 In this case, the
defenses were deemed inappropriate because "the breakup of
the company was inevitable." The situation had become one of
an auction, and:
The duty of the board had.., changed from the preservation of
Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's
value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit .... The directors' role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of
- See, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57.
3 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The take-over scenario in Revlon came into being
when Pantry Pride initiated talks with Revlon concerning a friendly acquisition.
See id. at 176. After an initial offer of between $40 and $50 per share, Revlon's
chairman cut off talks, and all subsequent offers were rebuffed. See id. Concerned
about a hostile takeover by Pantry Pride, Revlon's board adopted a "Rights" plan
and also repurchased roughly 16.5% of its outstanding 30 million shares. See id.
at 177. In response to Pantry Pride's first hostile tender offer, the Revlon board
made its own offer for up to 10 million shares. See id. at 177. After Pantry Pride
escalated its bids, ultimately offering $56.25 per share, Revlon found its "white
knight" in Forstmann, Little & Co., whose less-than-chivalrous final offer was
conditioned upon a "lock-up" option to purchase two of Revlon's subsidiaries at a
price below that of their estimated market value. See id. at 178. Furthermore, the
"Rights" covenants were to be excised, and Revlon was to be subject to a no-shop
provision. See id. Ultimately, Pantry Pride raised its offer to $58 per share. See
id. at 179.
' Id. at 176.
" Id. at 180 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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the company. 8
The court emphasized that it was the interests of the
shareholders that are paramount in such a situation. The con-
cern for other constituencies, apparently endorsed by Unocal,
was seen as "inappropriate" when the auction was in progress,
because the object of such an auction is to sell the company "to
the highest bidder.' The court even went further, seemingly
explaining away Unocal's discussion of the permissibility of
looking to the concerns of other constituencies. Discussing
Unocal's treatment of that issue, the Revlon court said that the
"board may have regard for various constituencies in discharg-
ing its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders." 3 Because this sentence
did not relate to the auction situation at hand in Revlon, it
appears to interpret the consideration of other constituencies
in the non-auction situation like that at issue in Revlon itself.
The test, according to the Revlon court, even in the face of the
deference inherent in the BJR, is whether the directors's con-
sideration of other constituencies "rationally relate[s]" to the
interests of the shareholders. But, of course, if that is the test,
Unocal's language does not add anything meaningful over and
above the strict fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder val-
ue 99
If Revlon appeared to herald a decisive victory of the fidu-
ciary duty to maximize shareholder profits over the business
judgment rule, that victory was subsequently put into doubt in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc." In that
case, the Delaware Supreme Court abjured the notion that
every prospective merger triggers a "Revlon duty" obliging
directors to become auctioneers. And so, Time, contemplating a
merger in which it would nominally be the object, was not
necessarily obliged to sell the company to the highest bidder.
Moreover, Time could adopt defensive mechanisms to prevent
just such an auction from occurring.10'
9Id. at 182.
97 Id. at 182.
" Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
The court emphasized this point again later in the opinion, saying that the
initial defenses put in place by the Revlon board before the auction began were
appropriate because they "worked to the benefit of the ahareholdera.7 Id. at 185.
"0 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
101 In the 1980s, Time sought to join with a company that produced vid-
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The Supreme Court of Delaware distinguished Time's
predicament from the "auction" at issue in Revlon."2 As the
Time court noted, "The adoption of structural safety devices
alone does not trigger Revlon. Rather,... such devices are
properly subject to a Unocal analysis."' Applying the Unocal
analysis, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that an
all-cash offer of adequate value could pose no "threat" justify-
ing defensive measures, and that, consequently, the board's
business judgment was a simple matter of calculating the
higher offer. Indeed, the court took note of Time's desire to
maintain a certain corporate culture and concluded that the
board of directors was not "under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover."O' Thus, even in takeover cases, corporate deci-
sionmaking involves more than "simple mathematical exer-
cise."0 5 With Time's board having reached the relative sanc-
tuary of the business judgment rule, the Time court concluded
that the rule's precepts "militate against a court's engaging in
the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative
merits of a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for
shareholders."" 6
The latest chapter in this series of takeover cases decided
eo/entertainment products that would complement Time's video and cable opera-
tions. See id. at 1143-44. Time's partner of choice was Warner. See id. at 1144.
Nonetheless, Time's board was wary of entering the merger market, out of con-
cerns that the company would be placed "in play" and its journalistic integrity, or
unique corporate culture, thereby jeopardized. See id. As a result, Time's board
favored a cash acquisition, rather than a less debt-ridden stock-swap. See id. at
1145. Time's board ultimately approved a deal under which Warner stock would be
purchased at a premium, such that Warner shareholders would end up owning ap-
proximately 62% of Time-Warner, and which ultimately included a "no-shop" or
"lock-up" agreement prohibiting Time from considering other proposals. See id. at
1146-47. Soon after, however, Paramount made an all-cash tender offer for out-
standing shares of Time of $175 per share, almost $50 over the stocls trading
price, an offer which Time subsequently rejected even as it escalated to $200 per
share. See id. at 1147-49.
"2 Id. at 1150-51 ("If ... the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is found
to constitute only a defensive response and not an abandonment of the
corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered, though Unocal
duties attach.").
'103 Id. at 1151.
104 Time, 571 A.2d at 1150; see also id. at 1154.
105 Id. at 1153.
" Id. at 1153.
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by the Supreme Court of Delaware is Paramount Communica-
tions Inc. v. QVC Network Inc."0 7 This case involved Time's
jilted suitor, Paramount, which had subsequently sought a
merger with Viacom and then adopted defensive measures to
ward off the tender offer of another company, QVC.03 The
Supreme Court of Delaware began its decision on an ominous
note for the business judgment rule, declaring that takeovers,
mergers, and acquisitions constitute "rare situations which
mandate that a court take a more direct and active role in
overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by direc-
tors."1"9 This heightened scrutiny means that Revlon duties
are in play not only when the corporate entity is subject to
"break-up" but also when a change of control is imminent." 0
In the sale or change of control scenario that confronted Para-
mount, for instance, the Paramount directors were under "an
obligation to take the maximum advantage of the current op-
portunity to realize for the stockholders the best value reason-
ably available.""
That said, however, the Paramount court appeared to
recoil from a commitment to the business judgment of pure
calculation that it had just implied, admitting that "[tihere are
many business and financial considerations implicated in in-
vestigating and selecting the best value reasonably avail-
able."" Thus, even in a so-called Revlon situation, where the
director is ostensibly reduced to an auctioneer, courts must
remain cognizant of the fact that "[tihe board of directors is the
107 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
100 Paramount, whose board, still searching for a vertically integrated marriage
of entertainment production and distribution, sought out Viacom in 1990. See id.
at 38. Ultimately, the two companies agreed that Viacom would purchase Para-
mount with a package of cash and stock worth $61 per share. Paramount's board
approved the merger, which included a 'no-shop provision, a termination fee pro-
vision, and a stock option provision entitling Viacom to purchase 19.9%7 of
Paramount's outstanding common stock at $69.14 per share should Paramount fail
to complete the transaction. See id& at 38-39. This latter provision had some un-
usual provisions that made it potentially exorbitant for Paramount to back out of
the merger. See id at 39. Subsequently, QVC made an all-cash tender offer of $80
per share. Despite QVC's more attractive measure, Paramount's board esentially
adhered to the merger agreement with Viacom, including its elaborate defense
provisions. See id at 39-41.
1 Id at 42.
10 Id. at 46-48.
m Id. at 43.
1 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45.
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corporate decisionmaking body best equipped to make these
judgments.""' The appropriate inquiry, then, is whether "the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect deci-
sion."" In short, even in such an apparently formulaic pro-
ject as determining the best value for a company, "courts will
not substitute their business judgment for that of the directors,
but will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance,
within a range of reasonableness.""' Even so, however, the
court concluded that the "significant [$1 billion] disparity of
value" between the QVC and Viacom offers, as well as the un-
informed manner in which the board's decision had been made,
undermined any contention on its part that its decision was
strategic or even reasonable."6
These takeover cases highlight the abiding paradox repre-
sented by the coexistence of the fiduciary duty to maximize
profits and the business judgment rule. Even in such a seem-
ingly numbers-oriented alembic as a takeover bid, the courts
appear to be unwilling to reduce business judgment to a mat-
ter of achieving the highest profits for the shareholders. In-
deed, Unocal and Time demonstrate that the use of defensive
mechanisms that would appear to work against shareholder
profits are paradigmatic instances of the validity of business
judgment based on less profit-driven considerations, such as
corporate culture (in the case of Time) or other constituencies
(in the case of Unocal).
And as for auctions and bidding wars, their lesson may be
that value itself is no simple matter. As the court in Para-
mount suggested, value can be chimerical, and the business
judgment rule, to an extent, accommodates its just appraisal.
Yet the takeover cases also demonstrate that the business
judgment rule hardly emancipates directors from their fidu-
ciary duty to maximize shareholder profits. On the contrary,
the takeover cases impose more difficulties for the directors in
exercising their judgment, more points at which they must tie
their decisions, however remotely, to the goal of enriching
shareholders.
113 Id.
11 Id.
" Id.
Id. at 50.
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Finally, the takeover cases return us to the question of the
impetus behind the business judgment rule. If nothing else,
the Delaware Supreme Court displays a marked ability to
address business decisions in a very detailed way. This ability
undermines the notion, often seen as supporting the BJR, that
courts are incapable of such analysis. On the other hand, the
Delaware court's willingness to impose added thresholds in the
exercise of business judgment would seem to draw into ques-
tion the argument sometimes made by law and economics
scholars that the business judgment rule shields economic deci-
sions from non-economic decisionmakers (i.e., courts).11 7
These explanations for the BJR are the focus of the next sec-
tion.
B. The Dominant Explanations for the Business Judgment
Rule
The difficulties inherent in balancing the strict underlying
duty to maximize profits with the deference to managers inher-
ent in the business judgment rule have been the subject of
much scholarly inquiry. To date, two principal theories have
competed to explain and justify the BJR and to resolve the
apparent dilemma between the rule and the duty to maximize
shareholder returns."1 The first theory asserts that the BJR
keeps courts out of boardrooms where they have little exper-
tise. One might refer to this as the 'traditional" rationale. The
traditional rationale behind the BJR is based on the assump-
tion or assertion that judges generally are not competent to
assess the conduct and decisions of professional business peo-
ple. Thus, the rule "reliev[es] the courts from the duty to do
what courts profess to be incompetent to do."1 9 Even the
Dodge court appeared sympathetic to this rationale, conceding
that judges are not business experts."'
This rationale, however, seems more than a little disingen-
117 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
See Bartley A. Brennan, Current Developments Surrounding the Business
Judgment Rule: A 'Race to the Bottom" Theory of Corporate Law Reuived, 12
WHITrER L. REV. 299, 302 (1991).
'*9 Robert N. Leavall, Corporate Social-Reform, the Business.Judgment Rule and
Other Considerations, 20 GA. L. REV. 565, 603 (1986).
' Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
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uous. It does not explain, according to Easterbrook and Fischel,
why the same judges who decide whether engineers have designed
the compressors on jet engines properly, whether the farmer deliv-
ered pomegranates conforming to the industrys specifications, and
whether the prison system adversely affects the mental states of
prisoners cannot decide whether a manager negligently failed to
sack a subordinate who made improvident loans."
Law and economics theorists like Easterbrook and Fischel
have thus offered an alternative rationale. Predictably per-
haps, for them it comes down to the market. The key point is
not that judges are incompetent with regard to business; rath-
er, it is that judges are not a part of the business world. In
other words, "lilt is better to insulate honest decisions from
review than to expose managers and directors to review from
judges and juries who do not face market pressures."122 The
occasionally Olympian perspective of judges, in particular, may
skew business decisions insofar as "[t]he much-heralded inde-
pendence of judges.., although desirable for other reasons,
makes judges particularly poor candidates to make business
decisions because it frees them from the contractual and mar-
ket mechanisms that encourage sound decisionmaking.""'
The business judgment rule, then, acts as a kind of filter, one
that keeps the market-driven corporation pure of nonmarket-
driven impulses. The underlying duty is not enforced by courts
but by the markets-primarily the market for capital and the
market for corporate control.
One difficulty in accepting this justification is the contin-
ued support by law and economics scholars for maintaining the
underlying legal duty of maximizing shareholder wealth. If
courts should keep out of the market, and if the market is
sufficient to keep managers well-attuned to the interests of the
shareholders, then one might suppose that the most efficient
121 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 81, at 94; see also Balotti & Hanks,
supra note 76, at 1342 ("Courts readily plunge into many areas ... where they
have only limited or no experience and where their expertise, if any, is not obvi-
ous. Their forays into these areas, while often lamented, are not widely regarded
as turning courts into unacceptably intrusive supervisors of persons working in
these areas.").
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 81, at 100.
Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case,
40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1443 (1985).
[Vol. 63: 799
19971 DICKENS, ARISTOTLE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 827
way to achieve this outcome is to jettison this underlying duty.
Yet law and economics scholars are generally very much in
favor of maintaining and protecting it.'
Thus one important assumption binds these two promi-
nent explanations for the BJR: the continued importance of the
underlying duty to maximize shareholder wealth. Under both
these rationales for the BJR, courts are not the best mecha-
nism to enforce the underlying duty because of lack of exper-
tise or insulation from market pressures. Yet, the duty is tak-
en as a given. In other words, with these rationales the ap-
parent paradox between the strict underlying duty and the
deference of the BJR is a false one. The BJR is based on an
institutional concern about enforcement and should not be seen
as a retreat from the underlying duty.
C. Testing the Dominant Explanations with Seminal Cases
Are institutional reasons the best way to understand and
justify the business judgment rule? In answering this question,
it is useful to review two of the seminal, or canonical, cases in
the development of the BJR.
One such case was AP. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow.' In
that case, the board of directors of the AP. Smith Company
decided to donate $1,500 of the corporation's money to Prince-
ton University.' When shareholders voiced their displea-
sure, the company sought a declaratory judgment from the
I2 See Daniel . Fischel, The Corporate Governance Mouement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1264 (1982). There is a third, less prominent theory that argues that
the BJR reflects the need to encourage directors to act in accordance with their
expertise without incurring liability. One might refer to this as the practical ratio-
nale. Samuel Arsht, for instance, argues that the premises of the business judg-
ment rule are simply that 'as human beings, directors are not infallible and are
not able to please all of the stockholders all of the time." Arsht, supra note 77, at
95. Thus, "[t]he business judgement rule grew principally from the judicial concern
that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as directors if the
law exacted from them a degree of prescience not possessed by people of ordinary
knowledge." Id. at 97. The difficulty with this practical rationale is that it does
not explain why the BJR is more deferential to business decisions than other
kinds of decisions at issue in, say, tort suits. Also, if deference is truly necessary
to entice people of good will to be directors, it would not explain why this end
could not be satisfied by the relaxation of the underlying duty rather than a re-
laxation of the methods by which to satisfy it.
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
See iUi at 582.
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New Jersey Supreme Court validating the donation. 27 The
court began by tracing the evolution of corporations from enti-
ties chartered for the public benefit (in the eighteenth century)
to ones organized solely toward the end of private profit (in the
nineteenth century).' With this evolution, "a concomi-
tant... common-law rule developed that those who managed
the corporation could not disburse any corporate funds for
philanthropic or other worthy public causes unless the expen-
diture would benefit the corporation." 29
The court went on to suggest, however, that this nine-
teenth-century common-law rule was somewhat anachronistic,
even potentially pernicious, in a modern era in which private
wealth was concentrated in the coffers of massive corpora-
tions. 30 Thus, in order to adapt the rule to the modern era,
"courts... have applied it very broadly to enable worthy cor-
porate donations with indirect benefits to the corporation."''
Having acknowledged that the rule requiring corporations to
maximize profit had come to be interpreted flexibly, the A.P.
Smith court nonetheless asserted that corporate donations
could be justified even under its strictest interpretation.' 31
This was because "free and vigorous non-governmental institu-
tions of higher learning are vital to our democracy and the
system of free enterprise," societal forms which in turn "give []
[corporations] existence."33 Thus, the A.P. Smith court
seemed to rely as much on a notion that the underlying duty
should be adjusted for modern times as on any notion of judi-
cial deference to the market or to greater business acumen.
A.P. Smith, then, would appear to pose some dilemmas for
both the traditional and the law and economics models. First,
the A.P. Smith court refused to make the self-effacing asser-
tion that business decisions used some unintelligible calculus
beyond the ken of the judicial system. Second, the corporate
donation in A.P. Smith was not idiosyncratic-it was not a
market aberration. The donation was one that any board of
' See id-
' Id. at 583.
' Id. at 584 (citations omitted).
o See AP. Smith, 98 A.2d at 584.
131 See id. at 585.
"s Id. at 586.
m Id. at 590.
[Vol. 63:799
1997] DICKENS, ARISTOTLE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 829
directors might make, yet only the most strained and elaborate
extrapolation from the fiduciary duty could conclude that it
was profit oriented. The key to the court's decision upholding
the donation may have been the court's wariness about the
nineteenth-century common-law innovation requiring that
profit be the touchstone of corporate decisionmaking. The court
kept returning to the implicit suggestion that the rule must be
modified and its rigidity ameliorated to accommodate real
business decisions. It was as if the business judgment rule was
not a matter of judicial deference but more an organic balance
to the underlying duty-the necessary corrective to the duty's
rigidity. As such, it may also have been a legal incarnation of a
more humanistic, and more tenable, model of decisionmaking
in general.
Following AP. Smith in the line of classic business judg-
ment rule cases is Schlensky v. Wrigley.' Schlenshy involved
a derivative suit in which the shareholders attempted to force
the Chicago Cubs to install lights and provide for night games
in the Cubs ballpark, Wrigley Field.' The most prominent
of the defendant directors was Philip Wrigley, who was also
president of the corporation and its majority owner.' Citing
Wrigley's comments that "baseball is a 'daytime sport,' and
that installation of lights and night baseball games [would]
have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighbor-
hood," the plaintiff alleged that Wrigley and the other directors
were acting contrary to the proper interests of the corpora-
tion.37
The court started from the proposition that "the authority
of the directors in the conduct of the business of the corpora-
tion must be regarded as absolute when they act within the
law, and the court is without authority to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the directors."' This statement resonates
with judicial deference. The court proceeded to suggest a num-
ber of plausible explanations for the directors' decision not to
implement lights at Wrigley Field, including a notion that
237 N.E.2d 776 (11L. App. Ct. 1968).
*' Id at 777.
1 See i&
7 See id. at 778.
Id. at 779 (quoting Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540,
550 (N.J. 1923)).
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neighborhood decay might affect attendance, and a concern for
the ballpark's property value.'39 The court emphasized that it
was not making a decision as to the overall, balance-sheet
prudence of the directors' reluctance to institute night games.
Instead, blending formalism and self-effacement, the court
protested that such a judgment would be "beyond our jurisdic-
tion and ability."40 It would also (or therefore) contravene
the business judgment rule insofar as "the decision [was] one
properly before directors and the motives alleged in the
amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest in the making of that decision."'
One can thus see Schlensky as consistent with the tradi-
tional rationale for the BJR, i.e., that it is "beyond [the] ...
ability""" of courts to decide whether a business decision was
wisely made. One could also argue that the case is consistent
with the law and economics model; that is, the market appara-
tus is being preserved from non-market-oriented impulses."
Thus, it is better to indulge Philip Wrigley's financially dubi-
ous conduct than to allow judges and juries to impose their
notions of business on the Chicago National League Ball Club.
Wrigley, however quixotic, is a creature of the market and he
will live with the market repercussions of his decisions; judges
and juries will not.
But it is also reasonable to view Schlensky's use of the
BJR as a more fundamental attack on the underlying duty. It
would not take a degree from the University of Chicago School
of Business to establish that Phillip Wrigley was almost cer-
tainly making a poor business decision when he refused to
place lights in Wrigley Field so that the Cubs could play night
games.' Every other major league baseball team played
night baseball. The Chicago White Sox, playing across town at
Comiskey Park, played night games and outdrew the Cubs
significantly.'45 The supposed business justification for the
refusal to install lights-that night games would cause the
1- Schlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id
143 See EASTEMBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 81, at 100.
1" Schlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777.
145 See id.
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neighborhood to decay and thus hurt the property value of the
ballpark-was not only long-term and indirect but also quite
clearly wrong.
But if the justifications were strained from a business
perspective, they made much more sense from a non-financial
perspective. Wrigley may have felt a loyalty to the game's
tradition and to the neighborhood surrounding his club's park.
A strict application of the underlying duty to maximize profits
would have prevented him from taking such non-financial
considerations into account. To be sure, the facade of the opin-
ion serves the underlying duty through its rhetoric, but the
opinion is consistent with a belief that the BJR is more about
correcting the underlying duty than about who should enforce
it.
D. A New Explanation for the Business Judgment Rule
Thus, neither of the existing dominant theories of the
business judgment rule is mandated by the seminal cases de-
fining it. Moreover, in some important respects, the cases are
aligned with a notion that the rule is more about an underly-
ing distrust of the strict fiduciary duty to maximize sharehold-
er returns than about concerns surrounding how the duty
should be enforced. This, we propose, is the genuine, underly-
ing explanation for the existence and power of the BJR in the
face of an apparently inconsistent duty to serve the sharehold-
ers. As Dickens suggests in Hard Times, a manager acting as
the strict duty would require him to act would be seen as irra-
tional or childish. The BJR is thus a necessary corrective de-
vice to the irrationality of the underlying duty.
To describe this proposed explanation more thoroughly, it
is worth returning to the work of Martha Nussbaum and spe-
cifically to the theory of judgment that Nussbaum attributes to
Aristotle. Besides launching a critique of scientific rationality,
Nussbaum's work also advances a more humanistic model of
decisionmaking. This theory has three main components: first,
an appreciation for the particular; second, an openness to expe-
rience; and third, an emphasis on correct perception."'
Nussbaum first addresses particularity, which may be
'" NUSSBAUM Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 64.
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understood as a kind of refutation of the rationalist premise of
commensurability. Rather than viewing the particular as an
instance of a larger, more abstract phenomenon, Aristotle and
Nussbaum are determined to examine the particular upon its
own terms. As Nussbaum explains,
[Tihe Aristotelian agent scrutinizes each valuable alternative, seek-
ing out its distinct nature. She is determined to acknowledge the
precise sort of value or goodness present in each of the competing
alternatives, seeing each value so to speak as a separate jewel in the
crown, valuable in its own right, which does not cease to be sepa-
rately valuable just because the contingencies of the situation sever
it from other goods, and it loses out in an overall rational choice.14
It is this appreciation for the particular which leads neces-
sarily to an openness to, and a valuing of, experience. While a
scientific rationalist finds, at most, confirmation in each new
experience, Aristotle and Nussbaum find another facet of wis-
dom. Nussbaum's Aristotle insists that experience is especially
integral to proper conceptions of justice because the "the expe-
rienced judgments of the agent must both correct and supple-
ment the general and universal formulations of law."148 To be
sure, this is a less tidy way of knowing, but it may ultimately
be a truer one in that "the content of rational choice must be
supplied by nothing less messy than experience and stories of
experience." 49
Experience avails the decisionmaker very little, however,
without correct perception. It is in perception that rules play
their part, not as agents of coerced conformity but as guide-
posts of sorts. Rules may thus supply analogies assisting us in
contextualizing and assimilating experience. In turn, rules may
shift with experience and the analogies may change their
shade. In other words, "perception... is a process of loving
conversation between rules and concrete responses, general
conceptions and unique cases, in which the general articulates
the particular and is in turn further articulated by it.""0
To Nussbaum, literature has great importance in that it
1'7 NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 63.
NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 69.
149 NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 74.
11 NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 95.
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may teach us how to perceive correctly. Novels supply what
appears to be random experience and then show us its pattern,
or show what appears to be one pattern of experience and
reveal it as another altogether.'5 Thus, just as Gradgrind is
educated by experience, we are educated by Gradgrind. The
right perception that we learn from literature may be applied
to realms of unauthored (or unselfconsciously-authored) expe-
rience, such as that of law. 2
Nussbaum's Neo-Aristotelian theory of decisionmaking,
and its correlative critique of scientific rationalism is not com-
pletely foreign to legal circles. Justice Brennan, for example,
was suggesting something similar to Nussbaum's theory when
he championed "passion" as a basis for legal judgment. By
"passion," Justice Brennan meant "the range of emotional and
intuitive responses to a given set of facts or arguments, re-
sponses which often speed into our consciousness far ahead of
the lumbering syllogisms of reason." ' Indeed, Justice
Brennan traced this counterpoint to rationalism back at least
as far as Justice Cardozo, who, according to Brennan, "insisted
that we consider the role that human experience, emotion, and
passion play in the judicial process."'5
More recently, proponents of the law and literature school
have reinvigorated the argument for some sort of humanist
alternative to rationalist theories of legal judgment. Professor
Paul Gewirtz, for example, has looked to Aeschylus's Oresteia
in order to articulate such an alternative.' In fact, Gewirtz's
151 NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 95 ([Nlovels, as a
genre, direct us to attend to the concrete; they display before us a wealth of richly
realized detail, presented as relevant for choice.").
' NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 100 (The dialogue
between rule and perception in Aristotelian morality has a dose and intere3ting
relationship to the procedures of a good (legall judge, who must bring to bear, in
the concrete situation, her knowledge of law, the history of precedent, her own
sense of the moral convictions embodied in the law, and her understanding of the
case before her."). This view has been attacked by Alan Derahowitz, among others.
See Alan Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAIVS STORIES: NARRA-
TIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 99 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds.,). Like
Nussbaum, Dershowitz suggests that law should reflect human experience, but
Dershowitz argues that human experience is too random and chaotic to be
"cabined into the structure of nature.* Id. at 105.
William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and 'The Progress of the Law," 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 9 (1988).
15 Id. at 5.
Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1988) (Ae3-
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reading of Aeschylus's tragic cycle leads him to a conclusion
quite similar to that of Nussbaum, namely, that "[ilt is foolish
and perhaps dangerous... to imagine that law can or should
be made perfectly rational. In part, nonrational forces have a
place in law simply because "law's terrain... must be the
realities of life, in all their tangled complexity."'
Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman have made similar
arguments. In addition, they have pointed out that the great
benefit of scientific rationalism, predictability, is largely chime-
rical insofar as the results of deducing one's decision from a
fixed premise are not predictable at all. "[Wihile it can calcu-
late and produce predictable decisions, given certain laws and
provided particular facts, it cannot consider how such decisions
will affect individual people nor may it reconsider its initial
judgment in light -of such actual or unanticipated effects." 5'
According to Minow and Spelman, it is cognizance of the "actu-
al" ramifications of one's judgment that makes for "careful
thinking."158
Returning to the paradox posed by the coexistence of
directors' rigid fiduciary duty to maximize profits and the ap-
parent leniency of the business judgment rule, we might view
the former as the sort of algorithmic approach to decisionmak-
ing repudiated by Gradgrind, Nussbaum, Aristotle, and their
counterparts in the law and literature movement. As noted
earlier, the fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profit clear-
ly bears the dual hallmarks of scientific rationalism:
commensurability and metricity. In the case of the fiduciary
duty to maximize profits, the single commensurable unit of
value is, of course, monetary, and the metric is simply its max-
imization.
In contrast, the business judgment rule functions in much
the same way as Nussbaum's Neo-Aristotelian theory of deci-
sionmaking. It allows for an appreciation for the particular, an
chylus reveals a more haunting view of law: law is not and cannot be an enter-
prise of reason alone; it includes the nonrational emotions as an essential and
central ingredient.").
1" Id. at 1049 (quoting Paul Gewirtz, A Lawyer's Death, 100 HARV. L. REV.
2053, 2055 (1987).
... Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CAMDOZO
L. REV. 37, 42 (1988).
"aId. at 44.
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openness to experience, and the possibility of something like
perception. Guided by the evidence concerning the circum-
stances in which (and the information on which) the directors
made their decision, the judicial inquiry is not "whether the
decision made was correct or one which the court would have
made," but "whether the evidence does or does not establish
that the directors exercised due care and believed, on a reason-
able basis, that the challenged transaction was in the
corporation's best interest."' In other words, it is not an in-
quiry as to the "rightness" of the decision but about whether a
decision, in the Aristotelian sense, was made at all.
The tendency of the business judgment rule to validate the
particular is evident in a case like Schlensky v. Wrigley."€a In-
deed, Schlensky may be read as a triumph of the particular
(the particular dangers that lights posed to the neighborhood
and to the parks property value) over the general (the general
trend toward lighted ballparks, night games and profit-driven
sports enterprises).
In a sense, then, the Aristotelian rationale parallels the
traditional rationale behind the business judgment rule.'
While it is indeed disingenuous to assert that judges lack the
"ability" to fathom these business decisions," it is something
different to suggest that judges place a premium on experience
when evaluating business decisions. The ledger book does not
always do justice to the "tangled complexity" of business deci-
sions. Only experience can allow one to act with "flexibility,
responsiveness, and openness to the external.""s The busi-
ness judgment rule accommodates this by allowing judges to
defer to the experience of directors.
The business judgment rule thus incorporates many com-
ponents of Aristotelian rationality. Just as Gradgrind realizes
that he must release himself from the irrationality of a utili-
tarian calculus, corporate law has used the BJR to release
corporate managers from the irrationality-and perhaps the
11 Arsht, supra note 77, at 118.
16 237 NXE.2d 776 (IlL App. Ct. 1968).
161 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
16, Schlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780; cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 81, at
94 (questioning "why same judges who decide whether engineers have designed the
compressors on jet engines properly," cannot make business judgements).
16 NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 74.
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inhumanity-of the strict fiduciary duty to maximize value to
the shareholders. Without the liberation of the BJR, the law
would force corporate managers to act like the "uneducated"
Gradgrind: obtuse, unattuned to the particularities and com-
plexities of each decision, and unable to take account of value
that is not translatable to the single metric of shareholder
wealth. With the BJR, however, corporate managers are liber-
ated in some respects from the irrationality required of them
by the underlying duty that the law has established.
IV. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS SECOND BEST
Even taking into account the humanistic effect of the busi-
ness judgment rule, it is important to recognize that the law
-like the educated Gradgrind-is not yet at rest. At the com-
pletion of the novel, Gradgrind "mistrusts" himself. This mis-
trust derives from a growing suspicion as to the flawed nature
of the utilitarian ethic. It is not only that, however. Perhaps
Dickens wants the reader to recognize that Gradgrind's jour-
ney is hardly over; that without some other ethic to put in
place of utilitarianism, Gradgrind is still ethically at sea. Fur-
ther, Dickens may believe that mistrust of one's own ability to
make perfect judgments is an important part of a correct ethi-
cal stance toward the world. In either case, corporate law has
much to learn from Dickens's critique of utilitarianism and
from Gradgrind's ultimate mistrust of himself. Corporate law
should experience, and admit to, similar mistrust.
There are at least two grounds for mistrust of contempo-
rary corporate law. One has been stated in the first portion of
this article.' Similar to Gradgrind's recognition of the
flawed nature of the underlying utilitarian ethic of his time,
corporate law should recognize that the underlying utilitarian-
ism-based duty of corporate law asks managers to act irratio-
nally. The second reason corporate law should mistrust itself is
that the BJR provides managers with only a second-best solu-
tion. As we have seen, the BJR gives managers some flexibility
in pursuing profit, but the underlying duty remains intact. In
Hard Times, however, the late-novel Gradgrind does not ulti-
mately believe that all that is needed is greater allowance with
16 See supra Parts I & IL
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regard to the ways in which the underlying "good" of utility be
served. This is how the BJR exerts its humanism within corpo-
rate law, however it leaves the law in an awkward position.
Consider again the seminal cases of Dodge v. Ford" and
Shelansky v. Wrigley." Henry Ford was a masterful busi-
nessman. At the time of the Dodge brothers' suit, the Ford
Motor Company was averaging about $20 million profit per
year on an annual investment of a mere $2 million." One of
the components of Ford's success was his decision to pay his
workers a higher-than-market wage.s When the Dodge
brothers, then shareholders in Ford Motor Company, com-
plained about the company's failure to issue dividends, Henry
Ford could have easily and correctly justified his policies as
being consistent with the long-term interests of the sharehold-
ers. Yet, he chose to admit during the trial that profit was not
his primary goal, and the Dodge brothers won their suit."s In
contrast, Philip Wrigley was almost certainly making a poor
business decision when he refused to place lights in Wrigley
Field so that the Cubs could play night games. In Shelansky's
suit however, the court deferred to Wrigley because he justified
his actions on the grounds that it would be in the long-term
financial interest of the ball club. 70
Under a legal regime governed by the BJR, therefore,
what the directors do appears to be less important than what
they say they do. In effect, directors are forced to reafi the
fiduciary duty to maximize profits rhetorically, even if they are
acting against that duty in actuality. The business judgment
rule props up the fiduciary duty to maximize profits-turning
it into a shibboleth of sorts--even as it ameliorates its harsh-
16 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
16 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
167 See WKInAM A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER, BusINEss ASsOCIATIONS: AGEN-
CY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 270 (3d ed. 1997).
18 See id. at 271 n.1 (citing P. COLLIER & D. HORowrrz, THE FORDS: AN AMER-
IcAN EPic 66-67 (1987)).
1" In court, Ford was asked for what purposes Ford Motor Company was orga-
nized. He answered that it was "[o]rganized to do as much good as we can, every-
where, for everybody concerned .... And incidentally to make money." A. NEVINS
& F. HILL, FORD, EXPANSION AND CHALLENGE, 1916-1933, at 99 (1957). In an
interview with Detroit News, Ford also said, 'I do not believe we should make
such an awful profit on our cars. A reasonable profit is right, but not too much.'
Id. at 97.
'70 See Shelansky, 237 N.E.2d at 180-81.
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ness. Thus, even if the BJR, in fact, releases corporate direc-
tors from the legal requirement of being automatons, they
must be sure not to admit their freedom.
In this respect contemporary corporate law is not as ad-
vanced as the mind-set of the educated Gradgrind. The BJR
allows managers to avoid the worst of the irrationalities of the
strict, utilitarian-based duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
But in comparison to the educated Gradgrind, who has learned
to mistrust the utilitarianism itself and seems to seek a re-
lease from it, corporate law is still clearly attached to the irra-
tionality of profit maximization. Even with the BJR's deference
to managers' decisions, the managers must still pay rhetorical
homage to the strict underlying duty.
To be sure, evidence of Gradgrind-like development exists
within corporate law. Almost thirty states have adopted stat-
utes allowing corporate managers to take into account the
needs of stakeholders other than shareholders.' This trend
reveals a mistrust of the underlying duty in that those statutes
allow managers to make decisions on some basis other than
shareholder wealth maximization. They do more than the BJR
because they expand the definition of the underlying duty
rather than simply expanding the manner in which it can be
served. 72 In this respect, they allow managers and directors
to be more rational than under the strict profit-maximization
rule. Directors and managers can be more attuned to the par-
ticularities of each business decision, which improves their
171 The scholarship on the so-called constituency statutes is fairly extensive. See,
e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPO-
RATE LAW (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995); William J. Carney, Does Defining Constit-
uencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with
Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97
(1991); Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46
BUS. LAw. 1355 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fidu.
ciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 33-35 (1991); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockhold-
ers and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REv. 121 (1991); Steven M.H. Wallman, The
Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Direc-
tor Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991).
172 See, e.g., Waliman, supra note 171, at 170-71; see also Lawrence E, Mitchell,
A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes, 70 TEL. L. REV. 579, 580-581 (1992) (suggesting that constituency statutes
"would put to rest the notion that directors are in any sense agents of the stock-
holders and that stockholders are thus the exclusive beneficiaries of directors'
duties").
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ability to consider their decision with care.
These statutes do not represent the dominant rule within
corporate law, however. As noted earlier, the rule that share-
holder interests are supreme holds firm in Delaware, the key
jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. One must
only remember Chancellor Allen's proclamation: "It is the obli-
gation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the
long-run interests of the corporation's shareholders; that they
may sometimes to do so 'at the expense' of others... does not
for that reason constitute a breach of duty." ' Even outside
Delaware, the shareholder-dominant view of corporate law
continues as a presumption.'74 It is still extremely rare for
courts to endorse the view that corporate directors may consid-
er the interests of other constituencies without reference to
shareholder return.'75 As Lawrence Mitchell urges, "[tihere is
no serious disagreement with the proposition that directors'
fiduciary duties are directed towards the stockholders." 76
Moreover, even in those states that have adopted stake-
holder statutes, the statutes typically suffer from one of the
flaws of the BJR-their dominant effect is to release from
responsibility rather than to augment responsibility.'" These
, Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (DeL Ci. 1986) (citation omitted).
174 Dodge, still the paradigm case, is of course from Michigan.
17 As of 1992, Professor Lawrence Mitchell could state that, to his knowledge,
no court had squarely endorsed such a view. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical
Look at Corporate Gouernance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1284 n. 79 (1992). Mitchell
does, however, cite one possible exception, Herald Co. u. Seawall, 472 F.2d 1081
(10th Cir. 1972) (holding that the business judgement rule protects directors who
choose to create employee stock option plan even though purchase of stock for
plan caused corporation to lose money), but even that opinion is replete with ref-
erences to the manner in which the interests of the shareholder are advanced by
the employee stock option plan. See id. at 1094-97.
17. Mitchell, supra note 175, at 1264 n.2, at 1284; see also Dodge, 170 N.W. at
684 ("The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
[the end of the maximum profit for the shareholders], and does not extend to a
change in the end itself . ..').
' Connecticut is the only state that requires, rather than permits, corporate
directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies:
[A] director of a corporation... shall consider, in determining what he
reasonably believes to be the best interests of the corporation, (1) the
long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the
interests of the shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including
the possibility that those interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation's
employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers, and (4) community and
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stakeholder statutes originated in efforts by states to protect
native businesses and their management from takeovers, espe-
cially on the part of out-of-state acquirors."7 ' Without these
statutes, the directors of a target company would typically be
required to sell the company to the highest bidder even if do-
ing so would mean that local control, and perhaps local jobs,
would be lost.'79 With these statutes, corporate managers
have greater ability to decline the takeover offer by claiming
that the takeover would harm employees or some other
stakeholders." °
These statutes have thus been the subject of a powerful
critique. Even though they give corporate directors the ability
to take account of the needs of stakeholders other than share-
holders, they do so at the price of also giving directors the
power to make decisions with none of the stakeholders in
mind, as long as such decisions are cloaked in the rhetoric of
stakeholder concern.'8' These statutes have no substance1 8
societal considerations including those of any community in which any
office or other facility of the corporation is located.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-313, 33-756 (West 1987). According to Charles Han-
sen, of the states with stakeholder statutes only Iowa, Indiana, and Pennsylvania
(in addition to Connecticut) permit directors to place other constituencies on the
same footing as shareholders. Hansen, supra note 171, at 1370, 1375.
17' The first of these statutes was adopted in Pennsylvania in 1983 and amend-
ed in 1990. The law declared that the management of a company incorporated in
Pennsylvania could, in making the corporate decisions, consider the effects of such
acts on the employees, suppliers, customers, and communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation were located. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 515(b),
171(b); see also Kent Greenfield, From Rights to Regulation in Corporate Law, in 2
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW 1, 3-4 (Fiona Patfield ed.; 1997). The political
impetus behind the passage of the Pennsylvania statute was the fear of corporate
takeovers of Pennsylvania companies and the subsequent loss of jobs in the state.
See Steven Lipin, Conrail Fight May Hinge on Pennsylvania Law, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 28, 1996, at C1 (noting that 1990 amendments to Pennsylvania statute were
adopted when Belzbergs of Canada were fighting for Pennsylvania-based Armstrong
World Industries); Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Boards of Directors,
2 STETSON L. REV. 197, 220 (1991).
" See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (concluding that concern for non-shareholder constituencies is "inappro-
priate" when "auction" among various active bidders is taking place).
" See Wallman, supra note 171, at 183-87. For an example of how the statute
works in practice, see Lipkin, Supra, note 178, at Cl; Steven Lipkin & Anna
Wilde Mathews, CSX Wins Ruling in Bid to Buy Conrail, Setting Back Rival Nor-
folk Southern, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996; Steven Lipkin & Anna Wilde Mathews,
Seeking Concessions from CSX-Conrail Is Seen as Most Likely Move by Norfolk,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1996, at A1O.
... Commenting on a proposed stakeholder statute in New York, then-Commis-
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and cannot typically be enforced by any non-shareholder con-
stituency."s They protect directors but ask for little in re-
turn.
This is not to say that these constituency statutes are a
bad idea as a normative matter. Even though concern for
stakeholders was not the statutes' primary impetus,
stakeholders other than shareholders will almost certainly be
among the statutes' beneficiaries. Moreover, the statutes
should be applauded-as the BJR should be-for allowing
eioner Grundfest of the United States Securities and Exchange Comm;ion re-
marked:
The grant of authority without accountability raised the real and present
danger that boards will use [the stakeholder statute] as a fig leaf Specif-
ically, [the statute] may allow boards to rationalize decisions that they
would not otherwise support in the name of constituencies who are pow-
erless to monitor or challenge the actions that are purportedly taken in
their interest.
Letter from Joseph A. Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission,
to Mario Cuomo, Governor of New York (June 6, 1989), quoted in Mitchell supra
note 172, at 580 & n.4; see also Committee on Corporate Takeover Legislation,
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report on Governor's Program Bill No. 128
and Subsequent Amendments (1989), reprinted in LAWnCE E. MITCHEL & LEWIS
D. SOLOMON, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE: CASES, MkTERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS FOR AN ADVANCED COURSE IN CORPORATIONS 539 (1992); Committee on
Corp. Laws, ABA Business Law Section, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990) (articulating concern that stakeholder stat-
utes may "pose potential for mischief"); Carney, supra note 171, at 418; Hanks,
supra note 171, at 24.
11 For Professor Mitchell's proposal suggesting a manner in which to interpret
these statutes so as to give them substance, see Mitchell, supra note 172. Unfortu-
nately, Mitchell's proposed interpretation has not yet been adopted by any court.
11 In fact, several statutes explicitly deny that they create any enforceable duty
to the constituencies whose interests may be considered. Se, ag., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (Mfichie 1991) (declaring that the director's authority is discretion-
ary and "shall not be deemed to provide to any constituency any right to be con-
sidered"); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (providing that
"nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties owed by any directors to any
person or entity to consider or afford any particular weight" to nonshareholder
considerations or abrogate any existing directorial duties). Even the Connecticut
statute, which makes concern for non-shareholder constituencies mandatory rather
than permissive, see supra note 177, does not allow anyone other than sharehold-
ers to sue directors for a breach of duty. See McDaniel, Stockholders and
Stakeholders, supra note 171, at 160. Thus, even the Connecticut statute does not
impose additional enforceable duties on the part of corporate managers. Some
commentators, however, most notably David Millon and Lawrence Mitchell, have
argued that the stakeholder statutes should be interpreted to give non-sharehold-
ers standing to sue. See Mitchell, supra note 172; David Millon, Redefining Corpo-
rate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223, 259. These proposals have not yet been adopted by
courts.
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corporate directors to act more rationally than they could un-
der a rule requiring the maximization of shareholder wealth.
Nevertheless, while both the BJR and stakeholder statutes
are improvements, they both must be recognized as flawed and
imperfectly rational. The BJR is still linked to the underlying
duty of maximizing shareholder wealth and merely offers free-
dom with regard to the method by which the duty is pursued.
Stakeholder statutes release managers from the duty to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth but replace that duty with a standard
that is largely empty of substance. They are both reactions to
the irrationality of the underlying duty, as neither would exist
but for the underlying flaws of corporate law.
Moreover, it is important to note that both the BJR and
the stakeholder statutes are typically permissive rather than
mandatory. Even with the BJR, and even in a state that has a
stakeholder statute on its books, a corporate director can pro-
tect herself from personal liability for a breach of fiduciary
duty simply by voting in every case to maximize value to
shareholders. The law may give directors the option to act
more rationally than the underlying duty would require, but it
is just that-an option. It is easier, and safer from the stand-
point of avoiding suit, simply to make whatever investigations
one must undertake to figure which decision has the highest
expected monetary return to shareholders and then to pursue
that course of action. Thus, even with the BJR and stakeholder
statutes, corporate law is still very much akin to the uneducat-
ed Gradgrind of the early pages of Hard Times.
V. SKETCHING A RATIONAL, ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF
CORPORATE LAW FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The underlying duty in corporate law-to maximize share-
holder returns-forces corporate managers to act irrationally.
The development of the business judgment rule has served to
mitigate this irrationality and has allowed managers to act in
a manner that more closely aligns with Aristotelian rationality.
But corporate law is still imperfect, even with the BJR and
stakeholder statutes, because it remains closely tied to an
irrational underlying duty.
A corporate law that encourages irrationality is not the
only choice. Corporate law could be based on a set of legal
[Vol. 63: 799
19971 DICKENS, ARISTOTLE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 843
duties that would allow-indeed expect-directors to act ratio-
nally. An expansive elaboration upon such duties and a de-
fense of them lie beyond the scope of this Article. But we can
offer a glimpse of what corporate law doctrine might look like
if it were based on Aristotelian norms of rationality and deci-
sionmaking.
A few words about the importance of this effort are in
order, as existing corporate law doctrine has been under in-
creasing attack recently.' The topics of corporate social re-
sponsibility, corporate democracy, and communitarianism in
corporate law have enjoyed a resurgence of interest in the
academy and even among the public at large.' Yet the pro-
ponents of this new trend have been criticized for failing to
provide a theoretical alternative to existing corporate law doc-
trine.' *The criticism has been that the "communitarian?
only have critiqued and have not been successful in providing a
genuine alternative upon which corporate law could be based.
Fleshing out an Aristotelian version of corporate law could go
far in responding to this criticism and in providing a theoreti-
184 See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 171; Ronald T. Green,
Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Gouernance, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); Greenfield, supra note 178; David Milon, New
Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Coop-
eration and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of
Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995); Mitchell, supra note 175; Law-
rence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1477 (1993); Miitchell, supra note 172; Karen L. Newman, The Just
Organization: Creating and Maintaining Justice in Work Environments, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1489 (1993); Marleen A. O'Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach to
the Japanese Corporate Governance Structure, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529
(1993); Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of
Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (1993).
18 See, e.g., Allan Sloan, The Hit Men, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 44; Louis
Uchitelle & Ni Eleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of Casualties,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al; Aightlines Interview with Albert Dunlap and
Robert Reich (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 14, 1996) (transcript available in
LEXIS-NEXIS library); Does America Still Work? (Forum), HARPER'S, May 1996, at
35; Corporations Under Fire (Editorial), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at D14; Todd
S. Purdum, Corporations Have a Duty to Employees, Clinton Says, N.Y. TIMM,
Mar. 24, 1996, at A32; see generally CHARLES DERBER, THE WILDING OF AMERICA
70-75 (1996).
18 Stephen NL Bainbridge, Community and Statism: Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 873-
75 (1997).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
cal basis for communitarian corporate law. The following gen-
eral principles might serve as good starting points in a discus-
sion of a new paradigm for corporate law.
A. Aristotelian Justice, or Fairness, as Metric
Because one of the principal Aristotelian critiques of utili-
tarianism, and thus of corporate law, is the dependence on the
maximization principle, the question, then, is what metric
should guide business judgment once we disregard the maximi-
zation of profits. Aristotle, and Dickens, would likely suggest
that corporate directors might be guided by Aristotelian jus-
tice, or fairness. For Aristotle, the two terms are contiguous
insofar as "just means lawful and fair; and unjust means both
unlawful and unfair."187
Aristotelian justice may be defined negatively as refraining
from acting unjustly or unfairly. Thus according to Rawls,
Aristotelian justice entails "refraining from pleonexia, that is,
from gaining some advantage for oneself by seizing what be-
longs to another... or by denying a person that which is due
to him."'88 What Rawls appears to be getting at is the notion
that injustice involves taking too much, whether of money,
pleasure, or whatever good. As Aristotle himself states, "the
unjust man takes more than his share."'89 Sometimes this
form of injustice or unfairness can consist in taking too little
(e.g., of that which is a burden). Thus, Aristotle informs us
that "[t]he unjust man does not always choose the larger share;
of things that are bad in themselves he actually chooses the
lesser share, but he is none the less regarded as trying to get
too much.""9
From this negative definition of Aristotelian justice (i.e.,
refraining from acting unjustly), we may move to an affirma-
tive one; for, if injustice involves taking too much of what is
good and too little of what is bad, we might say that justice
17 ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICs (Hugh Tredennick ed. & J.A.K.
Thomson trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1953) [hereinafter THE ETHICSl.
1 RAWLS, supra note 31, at 10.
1 THE ETHICS, supra note 187, at 172 ("[When a man takes more than his
share ... what actuates him is certainly some kind of wickedness (because we
blame it): viz., injustice."). THE ETHICS, supra note 187, at 175.
' THE ETMHCS, supra note 187, at 173.
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entails absorbing the proper, or proportionate, amount of both.
Aristotle tells us that justice is a sort of proportion."' Aris-
totle goes on to explain more fully the role of proportion in
defining the relationship between injustice and justice:
What is just in this sense, then, is what is proportional, and what is
unjust is what violates the proportion. So one share becomes too
large and the other too small. This is exactly what happens in prac-
tice: the man who acts unjustly gets too much and the victim of
injustice too little of what is good.'
Aristotelian justice then is quite the opposite of utilitarian
justice with its goal of net maximization. Aristotelian justice is
relatively indifferent to the grandeur of the total value, focus-
ing instead on its distribution.
Is it unworkable to use a notion of fairness as the domi-
nant guidepost for corporate doctrine? To be sure, the legacy of
Aristotle's conception of justice as proportion appears in the
works of legal philosophers, most notably H.L.A. Hart. Hart
adopts this notion of distributive justice wholesale, defining
justice "as maintaining or restoring a balance or propor-
tion."93 And so, Aristotelian justice is not alien to the law.
Moreover, the concept of fairness is utilized today even in a
number of areas of corporate law itself. Examples include the
requirement of fairness in dealings between majority share-
holders and minority shareholders in close corporations, M as
well as the requirement that self-dealing transactions be fair
to the corporation.95
Of course, one might object to the use of fairness as guide-
post on the basis of the practical observation that perfect jus-
tice, like perfect distribution, exists only in the abstract. The
response to this objection might be that justice as proportion
necessarily inhabits a scale in which the goal is to behave
... THE ETHICS, supra note 187, at 178; ([W]hat is just is proportionaL"). THE
ETHICS, supra note 187, at 178.
' THE ETHICS, supra note 187, at 179.
"' H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 155 (1961).
1 See, eg., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993); Vrlkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
11 See WIIAm L. CARY & MELVIN EISENBERG, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 684-88
(7th ed. 1995). Cf., e.g., Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest. Efficiency,
Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); Gregory C.
Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1266 (1997).
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more justly, not with absolute justice. After all, as the philoso-
pher Stanley Cavell has noted, "any actual society will be im-
perfectly just,"'96 but that fact does not obviate society's re-
sponsibility to strive toward justice. Likewise, even if the cor-
porate director cannot act with absolute justice, he or she
should be obliged to make the decision that is more just in any
given instance. That is, rather than acting to maximize share-
holder profits, the director should act so as to achieve the bet-
ter proportion of good and/or ill among the corporation's vari-
ous stakeholders or constituencies. This is a metric that re-
flects reality without exploiting it, recognizing as it does that
we are bound to confront an "uncertain measure of injustice, of
inequalities of liberty and of goods that are not minimal, of de-
lays in reform that are not inevitable.""9
Moreover, a dependence on fairness rather than maximiza-
tion will require the managers of a corporation to be very at-
tuned to the context of their decisions. We discuss below the
importance of looking for the particular in every decision, but
it is also worth noting that the concept of fairness, in itself,
requires an attentiveness to the specific circumstances of the
decision. By its very nature, fairness-in the Aristotelian
sense-requires a contextual judgment. We are reminded of
Sissy Jupe's account to Louisa of her questioning by Mr.
M'Choakumchild:
... "And he said, Now, this schoolroom is a Nation. And in this
nation, there are fifty millions of money. Isn't this a prosperous
nation? Girl number twenty, isn't this a prosperous nation, and an't
you in a thriving state?"
"What did you say?" asked Louisa.
"Miss Louisa, I said I didn't know. I thought I couldn't know
whether it was a prosperous nation or not, and whether I was in a
thriving state or not, unless I knew who had got the money, and
whether any of it was mine. But that had nothing to do with it. It
was not in the figures at all," said Sissy, wiping her eyes.
"That was a great mistake of yours," observed Louisa.19'
The evaluative instincts of Sissy Jupe should be what the law
requires of corporate managers. Just as Sissy attempted in
'" STANLEY CAVELL, The Conversation of Justice: Rawls and the Drama of Con-
sent, in CONDITIONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME 101, 107 (1990).
197 Id. at 108.
19 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 62.
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evaluating her "nation" to make a contextual judgment about
fairness, corporate managers should be asked to make similar
judgments in evaluating decisions for their firms.
B. The Priority of the Particular
According to Martha Nussbaum, one of the elements of
Aristotelian rationality is the priority of the particular over the
general.' This means that a decisionmaker should be at-
tuned to the details and intricacies of each situation. For one
to make a decision based on a rule alone represents an impov-
erishment of the decisionmaking process because rules are best
seen as guides to reason rather than definitive and complete
sources of wisdom."0 One cannot accept a single underlying
rule without drastically undercutting the rationality of the
decisionmaking process.
Applied to corporate law, this insight would suggest that a
practice of maximizing shareholder returns in every case
should not necessarily provide a definitive defense to a claim
that the director breached her fiduciary duty. Indeed, directors
would not be able to depend on any set of generalized rules in
managing the enterprise. To borrow an Aristotelian metaphor
offered by Nussbaum, such a dependence on a set of rules to
guide decisionmaking would be like using a straight-edged
ruler to measure the contours of a fluted column."' Instead,
just as Aristotle noted that Greek architects used a flexible
strip of metal to measure curved spaces, so too corporate man-
agers should have to use flexible, contextualized decisionmak-
ing to make proper decisions.
As an illustration, consider a shoe manufacturer that has
long operated a factory in a working-class neighborhood in
Boston. The relationship between the company and the
neighborhood has been strong; over the years the company has
made charitable contributions to build and support the neigh-
borhood. The company indeed claims that its position in, and
relationship with, the community is an important part of its
corporate culture. The company's strategists have determined,
NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 66-75.
NUSSBAUg, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 69-70.
' NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 69-70.
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however, that though the factory is profitable, manufacturing
costs would fall and company profits would increase if the
company were to move its production facilities to a southern
state with lower labor costs and to a developing nation where
environmental regulations are less strict. Ultimately, these
moves would force many of the company's employees out of
work.20 2 The company directors then face the question of
whether they should vote to maintain the production facility at
its current location.
Under the existing majority rule in corporate law, it is
clear what the directors are required to do. Keeping the factory
in Boston will decrease profits, and directors who knowingly
make decisions that fail to maximize shareholder profit have
violated their legal duties.03
Under an Aristotelian-based corporate law doctrine, how-
ever, it would be less clear what the directors should do. They
would not be able to make a decision based only upon which
option would maximize shareholder profit. On the contrary,
they would have to take care to become acquainted with many
aspects of the real problem such as the real long-term cost of
keeping the factory in Boston; the cost to the community of
moving the factory; whether there are ways to mitigate the
costs of staying or leaving; and whether the company has made
implicit or explicit commitments to its employees. This analy-
sis would not be a mathematical, Gradgrind-like calculus that
the directors could consult to ensure that they reach the "cor-
rect" decision. They would be asked to make the decision like
an astute human being in any other difficult circum-
stance-that is, through a careful and thoughtful consideration
of the many particularities of the situation in order to seek a
balance, a just fairness, among the parties.
In some respects, of course, the priority of the particular
will make the jobs of managers and directors much more diffi-
cult than under existing law. Directors, for example, will be
To compare the hypothetical with the situation of Stride Rite Corporation,
see Joseph Pereira, Split Personality: Social Responsibility and the Need for Low
Cost at Stride Rite, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1993, at A3.
See supra note 66-67, 173-76, and accompanying text. Because of the defer-
ence afforded the directors by the Business Judgement Rule, however, the Direc-
tors might be able to save the Boston factory if they were willing to lie about
their reasons. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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charged with attention to the particularities of the situation
and will be unable to depend on a set rule of profit maximiza-
tion. The difficulty of such attention is not surprising, however.
Acting as a human being is always more difficult than acting
as an automaton; it is more difficult to be a good judge than a
good actuary.
C. The Importance of Non-financial Factors
Another component of Aristotelian rationality is non-
commensurability, i.e., the recognition that not all value can be
assigned according to a single metric. A horse is more than the
sum of its bones and skin and flesh and an employee is more
than her output. Gradgrind recognized as much by the end of
Hard TYmes. Yet under existing corporate law, directors are
required to reduce all decisions to a solitary metric: the finan-
cial return to the shareholders. This is no more rational in the
boardroom of a twenty-first-century corporation than in the
factories of a nineteenth-century English mill town.
Such a dependence on one commensurable factor blinds
the decisionmaker to other important elements of the decision.
We are reminded of Louisa's ruminations upon visiting Ste-
phen Blackpool in the hovel where he lives. She has gone there
in sympathy after her husband Bounderby has fired Blackpool.
For the first time in her life Louisa had come into one of the
dwellings of the Coketown Hands; for the first time in her life she
was face to face with anything like individuality in connection with
them. She knew of their existence by hundred and by thousands.
She knew what results in work a given number of them would pro-
duce in a given space of time. She knew them in crowds passing to
and from their nests, like ants or beetles. But she knew from her
reading infinitely more of the ways of toiling insects than of these
toiling men and women.
Something to be worked so much and paid so much, and there
ended; something to be infallibly settled by laws of supply and de-
mand; something that blundered against those laws and floundered
into difficulty;, something that was a little pinched when wheat was
dear and over-ate itself when wheat was cheap; something that
increased at such a rate of percentage, and yielded such another
percentage of crime, and such another percentage of pauperism;
something wholesale, of which vast fortunes were made; something
that occasionally rose like a sea, and did some harm and waste
(chiefly to itself), and fell again; this she knew the Coketown Hands
to be. But, she had scarcely thought more of separating them into
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units than of separating the sea itself into its component drops 4
Existing corporate doctrine requires managers to think
about workers as Louisa admits to herself that she has consid-
ered them. That many corporate decisionmakers do not, in fact,
consider workers in this way speaks to the difficulty that hu-
man beings have with living up to (or down to) what tradition-
al corporate duties require. An Aristotelian model of corporate
decisionmaking, on the other hand, would recognize the hu-
manity of both the decisionmakers and the stakeholders by
asking corporate directors to do more than simply reduce every
decision to a financial one. There will often be aspects of a
decision that cannot appropriately and fully be captured by a
financial calculus. Some aspects of a decision might be put into
financial terms, but the exclusive use of such metricity will
blind the directors to other important characteristics of the
decision to be weighed. Still other components of the decision
will be important even if they are irreducible to financial
terms, or if in financial terms they would have no net effect.
Again, an example is in order. Daniel Fischel has suggest-
ed that corporate directors should violate the law if the expect-
ed returns from doing so would outweigh the expected costs of
doing so.2°5 For example, he implies that companies should
violate environmental law, say, by polluting a stream as long
as the expected gains from doing so exceed the expected penal-
ty.2"' Fischel may have a point. Many of us would choose to
park in a "no parking" zone for a few minutes if we thought
that we would not get a ticket. Similarly, perhaps we would
not be upset if Federal Express required their drivers to double
park whenever necessary to make an on-time delivery, so long
as the company were also sure to pay any applicable fines.
But there is something Gradgrindian in the insistence on
applying a cost-benefit analysis in every decision whether to
break the law."7 If Allied Chemical had performed such a
204 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 160-61.
206 Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1271 (1982).
See id. at 1270-71.
Indeed, even Oliver Wendell Holmes said that it was "bad men" who made
decisions based on cost-benefit analysis. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (As Holmes stated: "If you want to
know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only
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cost-benefit analysis with regard to its decision whether to be
complicit in an illegal dumping of what amounted to a devas-
tating amount of Kepone into the James River in the early
1970s, the directors would probably have found that the share-
holders were likely to benefit from such an act.' 3 Yet few
would applaud such a decision, and the failure to do so would
not be on the basis of moral squeamishness. Rather, the rule of
law is seen as an important public value deserving of respect
from individuals and corporations alike, even if the costs of
doing so are relatively low. To make a decision based on a cost-
benefit analysis alone places no value at all on the importance
of obedience to the law. To the extent that we believe respect
for the law should play a part in corporate decisions irrespec-
tive of the impact on shareholder returns, it must be acknowl-
edged that we must want and expect corporations to make
decisions based in part on values that cannot be reduced to the
only metric currently cognizable under corporate law.
One's opposition to Allied Chemical's decision would proba-
bly not be based solely on the respect for law, however. It
would also likely be based on a moral judgment that no person,
and no corporation, should make a decision that would cause
so much-and such a kind of-harm, even if the expected bene-
fit to shareholders were greater than the expected cost to
shareholders. An Aristotelian model of corporate decisionmak-
ing would give corporate directors the legal opportunity to act
on such moral judgments. Aristotelian corporate law would rec-
ognize that a blinders-on cost-benefit analysis amounts to a
childish and incomplete, if not inhumane, decision, rather than
the fiuition of correct decisionmakng.2"
One example of a decision that could not have been made
within a traditional corporate law framework is Levi Strauss &
Co.'s ("LS & Co.") decision to withdraw from participation in
the Chinese market. It is clear that China provides one of the
largest markets for consumer goods in the world and promises
to grow even more dominating as the years pass."' Yet sev-
for material consequences.").
2 See ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ET AL., ENVIRONMFTMAL LAW AND POLICY: A CASE-
BOOK ON NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY. 42-48; 160-62; 336-41 (1991). Alied's criminal
fine totaled a little over $13 million. See iai at 34L
See CASS R. SUNSTEiN, FaEE MRKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 137-39 (1997).
210 It is estimated that China's economy is growing at a rate of more than 1Mo
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eral years ago, after months of deliberation, LS & Co.'s board
of directors decided to end the manufacture and sale of its
jeans in China because of the Chinese government's persistent
record of human rights abuses.2"' The company decided that
the millions of dollars of profits that would be gained from
participating in the Chinese market were not worth its identi-
fication with, and implicit support of, a despotic and
authoritarian state.
LS & Co.'s decision would not have been possible for a
company subject to traditional fiduciary duty doctrine, rigor-
ously and honestly applied. The decision surely cost LS & Co.
and its shareholders millions of dollars. But because LS & Co.
is closely held among members of the Haas family, a family
which has a long tradition of corporate philanthropy and re-
sponsibility, the traditional duties were not a bar to the board's
decision. The board instead was free to make a decision based
on a range of factors, including the financial cost of leaving
and the moral cost of staying. The directors were free to make
this very difficult and troubling decision in a rational way: by
balancing and weighing a number of values that were not
necessarily commensurable."
An Aristotelian model of corporate governance would make
this kind of decisionmaking legally required and this kind of
outcome legally permissible for all corporations. A director
would not be able to defend against all accusations that she
breached her fiduciary duties by showing that she had maxi-
mized the value of the company to its shareholders. As
Gradgrind learned, human rationality cannot be captured
within a single metric: corporate law should not force directors
to act as though it could.
per year. Arne J. de Keijzer, Cracking the China Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
1993, at R1. U.S. exports to China rose from $5 billion to $9 billion between 1990
and 1993. Joyce Bentham, Lynn Curry, and Owen Ullman, Behind the Great Wall,
BUS. WK 43 (Oct. 25, 1993).
211 See Jane Palley Katz, Levi Strauss & Co.: Global Sourcing (A), Harv. Bus.
Sch. Case Study (1995); Jane Palley Katz, Levi Strauss & Co.: Global Sourcing
(B), Harv. Bus. Sch. Case Study (1995).
2 Jane Palley Katz, Levi Strauss & Co.: Global Sourcing (A), supra note 211,
at 1-3.
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D. The Absence of a Supreme Stakeholder
If we put these components of Aristotelian corporate law
together, we derive another component of an Aristotelian cor-
porate law. If well-made decisions focus on the particular rath-
er than the general and take into account a variety of different
and incommensurable values and goods, it will also be the case
that no single stakeholder can be considered supreme. Direc-
tors cannot be fully rational in their decisionmaking and al-
ways make a decision based on what is good for one constitu-
ency of the corporation. Some decisions, when well made, will
likely benefit shareholders most. Others, when well made, will
result in a greater benefit to creditors, customers, workers, or
the communities where the company does business. But it will
not be the case that one group will win out in every case.
In the small town of Waterville, Maine, a mostly female
work force has been sewing Hathaway shirts for over 150
years.2 In early 1995, Linda Wachner, the Chief Executive
Officer of The Warnaco Group, Inc., Hathaway's parent compa-
ny, went to Waterville to quell fears among the 500 Waterville
workers of an imminent plant closing. But sales of Warnaco's
various brands were booming and the stock price was soar-
ing.214 According to one account, Wachner assured Waterville
workers that she "would not close the plant" if the employees
"would do quality work and bring the cost of the shirt
down."2' 15
After Wachner's reassurances, the plant's employees for-
feited a pay raise to help pay consultants brought to Waterville
to teach them how to work more efficiently. The employees'
union persuaded the company to adopt a joint labor-manage-
ment program to address workplace problems and improve pro-
ductivity.216 By March 1996, the plant's employees had dou-
Adam Zagorin, Short.Shirted in Maine, TIME, June 3, 1996, at 68.
' See id. In fact, as of February, 1997, Warnaco's stock had achieved a five-
year average return of over 19%, the second-best within its industry group (ap-
parel-clothing and fabrics). See Industry.by-Industry, Who Leads the Field in Share-
holder Returns, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1997, at R4 (table).
' See Sara Rimer, Fall of a Shirtmaking Giant Saes Its Hometown, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1996, at A14.
"16 See Union Efforts to Increase Productiuity Not Enough to Keep Warna=o
Plant Open, DAILY LABOR REPORT, May 21, 1996 [hereinafter Union Efforts].
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bled the factory's productivity.217 The productivity consultant
claimed that the employees had "turned the plant around."28
Warnaco, in the meantime, recorded unprecedented profits.1 9
On May 6, 1996, however, Wachner announced that
Warnaco would quit making the Hathaway line and either sell
or scrap the Waterville plant. Hathaway shirts were not keep-
ing up with Warnaco's other, more profitable, product
lines."0 The Waterville workers were shocked. The chief
steward of the local union said that the announcement of the
closing was "totally, totally, unexpected."
What is interesting for present purposes is that Wachner
defended the decision by saying that the factory was "not mak-
ing money, and we're in the business of operating for a prof-
it."221 Closing the plant was the right thing for "the company
and the stockholders."22 By focusing on the concerns of the
shareholders, Wachner made the decision on the correct basis
according to traditional corporate law.'
Of course there may be more to Warnaco's decision than
that which appeared in the newspapers, and it is difficult to
evaluate the decision without access to more particulars of the
case. But the stated exclusivity of focus on the shareholders
exemplifies the Gradgrind-like irrationality of placing one
stakeholder above all others. The workers in Waterville had a
long-term relationship to the company; they had made sacrific-
es for the plant's success; the company had made assurances to
them; the factory was apparently doing relatively well. But
none of these things was said to matter when compared to the
need for the shareholders to make higher profits elsewhere.
This is not what Aristotle or Dickens would consider good
decisionmaking. If any one of us, as an individual, were to be
faced with a similar decision-a decision that would affect
many people with whom we had a long-term relationship-we
217 See Rimer, supra note 215, Union Efforts, supra note 216.
1 See Rimer, supra note 215.
' See Union Efforts, supra note 216.
See Rachel Spevack, Hathaway Jobs in Jeopardy, DAILY NEWS RECORD, May
7, 1996, at 1.
22 See Rimer, supra note 215.
See Rimer, supra note 215.
For an argument that Warnaco may have committed fraud on its employees,
see Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the
Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 721 n.26 (1997).
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would be likely, almost naturally, to make a decision based on
a balancing of many particulars. We would not simply choose
one group and make a decision based on what was best for
that group. If we did so we would be considered obtuse, or
childish. Yet this is what corporate law requires of directors. A
set of corporate fiduciary duties based on a notion of Aristo-
telian rationality would protect corporate directors from a legal
obligation to act in such an obtuse and childish way.
E. Process-Based Review
There is no doubt that an Aristotelianism-based fiduciary
duty doctrine would call for a more careful, probing, and sensi-
tive decisionmaking process than that required by the existing
utilitarian-based fiduciary duty doctrine. Such a change in the
underlying duty would require that those who monitor corpo-
rate decisionmakers, particularly courts, adjust the process of
reviewing corporate decisions.
Courts are called on to monitor the decisions of corporate
decisionmakers in the context of derivative suits brought by
disgruntled shareholders. Because of the business judgment
rule, a court's review of these decisions is typically quite super-
ficial, unless there is some reason to suspect a conflict of inter-
est on the part of directors.' Even though the underlying
duty of corporate managers-to maximize the value of the
company to the shareholders-is quite substantive, the court's
review of corporate decisions generally focuses on processes.
Ostensibly because of the court's stated hesitancy to substitute
its own judgment for the judgment of the directors, the court
instead looks to whether the decision was made after due con-
sideration, after consultation with experts, and with appropri-
ate notice.'
Under an Aristotelian fiduciary duty doctrine, judicial
review of corporate decisions would likely also be process
based. The very nature of Aristotelian decisionnaking would
make the substantive review difficult since courts would have
less access to, and less understanding of, the particularities in-
See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 195, at 603.
The paradigm case is Smith u. Van Gorhom, 488 A.2d 858 (DeL. 1985). See
also CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 195, at 602-05, 63L
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volved in each decision. But courts would not be helpless. Just
as a well-made decision under traditional criteria tends to have
certain procedural characteristics (consultation with experts,
due consideration, notice), a well-made decision under Aristote-
lian criteria will tend to have certain procedural characteristics
as well. These procedural characteristics could be used by
courts as guideposts to evaluate whether directors had satis-
fied their fiduciary duties.
The procedural characteristics of a well-made decision
within the new regime would flow from the substantive charac-
teristics. If directors are genuinely concerned about the partic-
ularities of each decision, they will have available detailed
information about the various aspects and effects of the deci-
sion. If directors recognize that some values cannot be cap-
tured fully by financial data and cannot be reduced to impact
on the bottom line, they will consider a range of other types of
information. If directors truly are concerned about the impact
of their decision on stakeholders other than shareholders, they
will consider and weigh such impacts. Indeed, as boards of
directors typically include strong advocates of shareholder
interests, perhaps boards governed by an Aristotelian fiduciary
duty doctrine would find it useful to invite representatives of
other stakeholders to be among their members." The con-
tours of these procedural characteristics would have to be de-
veloped over time by common law courts, just as the procedur-
al requirements under traditional doctrines have been spelled
out over time by common law courts. 7
2 Cf. CHISOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDs (1975) (advocating "public
interest directors" for the boards of major public corporations).
To expect companies to engage in this kind of decisionmaking is not unrea-
sonable. Consider again Levi Strauss & Co., which has implemented a company-
wide decisionmaking process that incorporates many of these Aristotelian notions.
In order to further its commitment to ethical decisionmaking within the corporate
setting, LS & Co. has adopted the 'principled reasoning approach" as the para-
digm for all of its decisionmaking. The "PRA" involves six discrete steps: (1) defin-
ing the problem; (2) agreeing on the principles to be satisfied; (3) identifying both
high-impact and high-influence stakeholders and assessing their claims; (4) brain-
storming possible solutions; (5) testing the consequences of chosen solutions; and
(6) developing an ethical process for implementing the solution. As explained by
Robert Dunn, Vice President of Corporate Affairs,
If there is anyone with a moral claim on the outcome [of a decision],
their views have to be clear and present. The principled reasoning ap-
proach insists that we identify the ethical issues, the people who are
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To the extent that an Aristotelian notion of fiduciary duty
imposes a different, greater, and more difficult set of duties,
the cost of monitoring the behavior of directors will likely in-
crease.' But one would expect to see more rational
decisionmaking under an Aristotelian regime; the real question
would be whether the improvement in rationality would offset
the increase in monitoring costs. Moreover, nothing in the
Aristotelian regime would prevent the capital market from
working its inexorable influence, for better or for worse, on the
decisionmaking processes of corporations. Because sharehold-
ers can always vote with their feet, one should not expect that
a transition to an Aristotelian regime of corporate law would
turn companies into eleemosynary institutions.
But the Aristotelian might propose that the traditional
focus on the cost to shareholders of monitoring the behavior of
directors is characterized by the same faults of narrowness and
irrationality as traditional corporate law doctrine. The cost to
shareholders of monitoring directors' behavior may indeed
increase. But that is not the sole concern. It is also important
to acknowledge that directors, acting through their corpora-
tions, have long affected a wide range of stakeholders, and law
has prevented them from taking such impacts into account. An
Aristotelian-inspired version of corporate fiduciary duties
would require directors to take into account these other
stakeholders, and-if the duties were to mean any-
thing-would give these other stakeholders some way to en-
force these duties.' So while monitoring costs to shareholder
will increase, monitoring costs to stakeholders will decrease.
That is, under present doctrine, workers or communities or
creditors have no legal standing to monitor the decisionma=ng
of the directors. Monitoring costs are quite high, if not infi-
nite . Under an Aristotelian regime, they will have the legal
affected, the possible solutions, and the ways to minimize harm. At the
beginning, people are frustrated with the process, but at the end they
feel it serves us well. It prevents the pressure of the moment, of person-
al involvement from getting in the way. Over time, people do it more
naturally.
Jane Palley Katz, Leui Strauss & Co.: Global Sourcing (A), supra note 211, at 6.
2" See EASTERBROOK & FISOHE supra note 81, at 38, 90-93.
1 Again, this is not so outlandish. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432
A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (affording creditor right to sue individual director for alleged
breach of duty of care owed to creditor).
2" For an argument that employees (like shareholders) bear costs of monitoring
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right to monitor directorial duties and some ability to enforce
them; therefore, monitoring costs for these groups will fall.
Thus, the key question, from the standpoint of monitoring
costs, would be whether the increase of monitoring costs to
shareholders would be offset by the decrease in monitoring
costs to other stakeholders.
CONCLUSION
As Dickens and Aristotle tell us, to have one's decisions
depend on the calculus of utilitarianism is irrational. Yet with-
in corporate law, the fiduciary duties of managers and direc-
tors require them to make decisions based on the very princi-
ples-commensurability and maximization-that Dickens and
Aristotle criticized so powerfully. This Article has argued that
the business judgment rule has sprung up as a corrective to
the irrationality of the underlying duty of maximizing
shareholder returns. It is as if the law could admit to the
words of Louisa Gradgrind: "With a hunger and thirst upon
me, father, which have never been for a moment appeased;
with an ardent impulse towards some region where rules, and
figures, and definitions were not quite absolute; I have grown
up, battling every inch of my way.""1 The adoption of the
business judgment rule has been an important part of this
battle. This Article has also suggested, however, that corporate
law could be brought still closer to the norms of good
decisionmaking suggested by Aristotle and Dickens.
We must make one important concession. While we believe
that corporate law indeed asks corporate managers to make
decisions in an impoverished, irrational way, we admit that
rationality is not necessarily the sole test for public policy.
Sometimes it is better to have a rule, even if it is a very sim-
ple, childish rule, than to offer discretion, especially if the
people who have responsibility for acting do not have the
"practical wisdom" necessary for making good decisions with-
out set rules. 2 The proper test for deciding the contours of
whether management serves their interests, see Kent Greenfield, The Place of
Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 299-303 (1998).
231 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 217.
" NUSSBAUM, Discernment of Perception, supra note 49, at 73.
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corporate fiduciary duty doctrine should mirror the test for
most other public policies: which set of legal rules gets us clos-
er to the kind of society we want.' Corporate law does not
exist in a vacuum of academic thought any more than in the
thin air of corporate boardrooms. To decide whether we, as a
society, want to retain existing corporate doctrine or move to
something more rational, we must decide whether society as a
whole is better off when corporate directors have the legal duty
to maximize profits or when they have the legal duty to take
into account the needs and desires of others affected by the
decision. This is in part an empirical question, in part a politi-
cal question, and in part a moral question. And it is not only
for lawyers, corporate executives, or shareholders to answer.
I For a more thorough defense of this point, see Greenfield, supra note 178, at
21-25.

